Native Hawaiians and the Law: Struggling With the He'e by MacKenzie, Melody Kapilialoha
Native Hawaiians and the Law: Struggling with the He 'e
ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 2005 SYMPOSIUM
Protecting Indigenous Identities: Struggles & Strategies
Under International & Comparative Law
NATIVE HAWAIIANS AND THE LAW: STRUGGLING WITH
THE HE'E
Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie*
I've been grappling the last few days with what to say as a
commentary to Judge Williams' speech, not knowing the content of
his talk ahead of time. Fortunately, I did have an opportunity to meet
with him yesterday and he told me that he was generally going to
discuss whether the law can be used to protect the interests of native
peoples, how well it can do that, and the idea of incremental changes
in the law - changes that one can see and are somewhat predictable -
versus paradigm shifts.
Last night, after listening to Professor Tsosie's keynote
speech, I went home and thought about what I could add to the
discussion. As I sometimes do, I turned to 'Olelo No 'eau, a book of
Hawaiian proverbs and poetical sayings, to see if there was something
about the law or a related topic that might give me an idea on how to
approach this commentary. After an hour or so of searching, I found
nothing, so I closed the book. I had a restless sleep, waking up in the
middle of the night to again think about what I might say. I woke up
this morning and I decided to try 'Olelo No 'eau one more time. I
opened it, pointed my finger, and ended up not with a proverb, but
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1 MARY KAWENA PUKUI, 'OLELO NO'EAU, HAWAIIAN PROVERBS &
POETICAL SAYINGS (1983).
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with a wood block print of a He'e, an octopus. I laughed and said to
myself, "That's exactly it, what better metaphor for the law then the
He'e, the octopus."
What attributes of the He'e are noted in Hawaiian proverbs?
The He'e is slippery, crafty, and dishonest:
He waha kou o ka he 'e.2
Yours is the mouth of an octopus.
You are a liar.
The He'e is many faceted and complicated:
Ka i 'a mana nui.
3
The fish of many divided parts.
The He'e changes color and camouflages itself. It can melt into the
background; it is malleable. And then of course, the He'e is famous
for its ink, with which it protects itself and obfuscates what should be
clear and apparent.
4
What has been our experience as Native Hawaiians with this
He'e? In this I echo Judge Williams' assessment of the Maori
experience - it has not been positive so far.
We need only to look to the Mahele of 1848, a process
advocated by western business interests and legal advisors to
Kamehameha III, which converted the Hawaiian communal land
system into a private-property fee ownership system. In the Mahele
process, only twenty-six percent of adult Hawaiian males received
land. The common Hawaiian people received less than 30,000 acres,
2 Id. at 104, # 969.
3 Id. at 149, # 1369.
4 Illustrating this point is another Hawaiian proverb:
Pupuhi ka he 'e o kai uli.
The octopus of the deep spews its ink.
The octopus escapes from its foes by spewing its ink and
darkening the waters.
Id. at 301, #2751.
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less than one percent of Hawai'i's four million acres of land.5
Subsequent laws after the Mdhele allowed land ownership by non-
natives, 6 adopted the adverse possession doctrine, 7 and permitted non-
judicial foreclosure of mortgages, 8 thereby leading to even greater
loss of lands by chiefs and commoners alike.
This negative experience with the law continued and, indeed,
Hawaiian suspicion of the law was validated in 1893 with the
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom by western businessmen assisted
by U.S. diplomats and troops. Hawaiians, believing that the U.S.
would honor international legal principles and its own laws sought to
prevent annexation and submitted petitions to the U.S. Congress -
over 21,000 signatures - protesting annexation.9 In a stunning move
that went against all American constitutional precedent, when
Congress annexed Hawai'i in 1898, it did so not through a treaty,
which would have required approval by a two-thirds majority of the
Senate, but rather by a joint resolution that required only a simple
majority in each house. 10  As acknowledged by Congress in 1993
through the Apology Resolution, 11 although Hawai'i was annexed to
5 Neil M. Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 848, 856
(1975).
6 Act of July 10, 1850, reprinted in 2 Rev. Laws of Hawaii 1925, at 2233-
34.
7 Act 22, Act of July 18, 1870, "An Act Limiting the Time Within Which
Actions May be Brought to Recover Possession of Land."
8 Act 33, Act of July 18, 1874, "Act to Provide for the Sale of Mortgaged
Property Without Suit and Decree of Sale." See ROBERT STAUFFER, KAHANA: How
THE LAND WAS LOST, 92-107 (2004) for a discussion of the act.
9 Noenoe K. Silva, Kanaka Maoli Resistance to Annexation in KC'E: THE
Hui ALOHA 'AINA ANTI-ANNEXATION PETITIONS 1897-1898, 1, 39 (Nalani Minton
& Noenoe K. Silva eds., 1998).
10 The U.S. Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Hawai'i was
annexed by a joint resolution of Congress. Joint Resolution of Annexation of July
7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750. See 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 238, 251-52 (1988) for a
discussion of the annexation process.
" To Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893
Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to Offer an Apology to Native Hawaiians
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the United States in 1898, the Hawaiian people never directly
relinquished their claim to inherent sovereignty or over their national
lands. This was the experience of Kanaka Maoli in our early days of
contact with western law.
Hawaiians in modern times also have found little real justice
through legal processes. Continuing disputes over monies due under
State law for Native Hawaiian programs, 12 the dismal track-record of
the Hawaiian Homes program established by a 1921 Congressional
Act to provide Hawaiians with lands, and ongoing clashes between
Hawaiians and private landowners seeking to prohibit access to
traditional cultural sites and gathering rights have only reinforced the
view that the law cannot be trusted. It is a He'e - slippery, shifty, and
devious.
And perhaps one small indication - something from my
personal experience - that this He'e has been slippery, that it
obfuscates, that you cannot trust it, is that in 1991, when the State
established a process for beneficiaries of the Hawaiian Homelands
trust to file damages claims, 13 only about a quarter of those who could
file claims did so. In an ironic twist not lost on the Native Hawaiian
community, the State subsequently dismantled the claims process
without paying any damages when it became clear that millions of
dollars would be necessary to address even the few claims that had
been filed.' 4 So this has been our relationship with the He'e - one of
distrust, of betrayal, of slipperiness, of laws that change just when it
appears that Hawaiians will benefit. Kanaka Maoli and Mdori,
unfortunately, share this common history.
But, I don't want to malign the He'e too much because
Hawaiians also recognize the many positive attributes of the He'e.
The liver of the He'e is mashed by fishermen and used as bait for
other fish. When fish are not biting, the fishermen take the heart of
on behalf of the United States for the Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L.
No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
12 See, e.g., Trustees of OHA v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446
(1987); OHA v. State, 96 Hawai'i 388, 31 P.3d 901 (2001).
" Act 323, 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws, codified as HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 674.
14 See generally, HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS TRUST INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
REVIEW PANEL, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE 2000 HAWAII
LEGISLATURE.
Native Hawaiians and the Law: Struggling with the He 'e
the He'e and mash it up and mix it with poi - and it is very 'ono.' 5
And we all know that the 'ono meat of the He'e mixed with lti'au
makes one of those tasty delicacies we like to eat. So the He'e has
that slippery aspect, that part we can't get our hands around, that part
we cannot hold. But it also has redeeming qualities that nourish us
and that we value.
In his talk, Judge Williams discussed the incremental nature of
change in the law. And, I think, this morning, when Davianna
McGregor and the panel members discussed the evolution of the law
in relation to traditional and customary rights of Hawaiians, 16 you
could see incremental changes over the course of almost thirty years.
From 1978, with the passage of the constitutional amendment
recognizing the traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiians,
to 1982, when the Kalipi17decision came out validating those rights,
although interpreting them more narrowly than we had hoped.
The next case - the 1992 Pele Defense Fund 8case - extended
those rights beyond the ahupua'a 19 if it could be shown that
traditionally the right had been exercised beyond the ahupua'a
boundary. Subsequent cases, most notably the PASH20 decision,
advanced and refined the law to the point where the latest cases have
held that government agencies, in granting permits for development,
must take into consideration the impact on Native Hawaiian
traditional and customary rights. The cases make clear that the
agency must make an independent assessment and identify the
15 "Delicious, tasty, savory[.]" MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL ELBERT,
HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 289 (rev. ed. 1986).
16 The panel, moderated by Professor Davianna McGregor of the
University of Hawai'i Department of Ethnic Studies, focused on environmental
versus development interests and the effects on Hawai'i's indigenous peoples.
17 Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
18 Pele Defense Fundv. Paty, 79 Hawaii 578, 836 P.2d 1247 (1992).
19 "Land division usually extending from uplands to the sea[.]" PUKUI &
ELBERT, supra note 15, at 9.
20 Pub. Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm 'n, 79
Hawai'i 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
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feasible action, if any, to be taken to reasonably protect Native
Hawaiian rights.
21
So illustrating Judge William's point, over the course of this
thirty-year period there has been an incremental change in the law, in
this instance largely for the good. But during that time of change,
there were many instances when the Native Hawaiian community had
to rally in order to make sure that those rights were continued and
preserved. There were efforts in the State legislature to restrict
traditional and customary rights, to define them, and possibly to
define them out of existence.
22
Judge Williams also discussed the concept of a paradigm shift
- an unexpected and unplanned for shift in the law that doesn't arrive
out of doctrinal discourse but out of social movements external to the
law. Hawaiians also have experienced a paradigm shift in the law,
but it has been a negative one - one with which we are still dealing.
That shift is reflected in the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Rice v. Cayetano.23
At the time that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) was
created by the 1978 Constitutional Convention, it was an accepted
doctrine that the people of the State had the authority to create such an
entity. The U.S. Supreme Court had issued the Morton v.
Mancari 4decision a mere four years earlier. It seemed that the
interests of native people were finally being recognized and that the
State of Hawai'i, in its efforts to address past wrongs, could use the
Mancari precedent in establishing OHA. Those of us who witnessed
the creation of OHA viewed it as a first step. It was to be the first
step that would lead, we thought, to federal recognition.
21 Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land Use Comm 'n, 94 Hawai'i 31, 39, 7 P.3d
1068, 1076 (2000).
22 See D. Kapua Sproat, Comment: The Backlash Against PASH."
Legislative Attempts To Restrict Native Hawaiian Rights, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 321,
for a discussion on attempts to limit traditional and customary rights.
23 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), held that state laws restricting
the electorate for Office of Hawaiian Affairs' trustees to citizens of Hawaiian
ancestry violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
24 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), upheld the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' Indian hiring preference to a Fifth Amendment racial discrimination
challenge by applying rational basis review and finding that the preference was
reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government.
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Let me give just a bit of context to the whole idea of federal
recognition. Remember that OHA was created in a time where self-
determination for Native Americans was a relatively new federal
policy. The idea of a government-to-government relationship with
the U.S., a new type of relationship, was intriguing. More than
intriguing, it was compelling. The old phrase "domestic dependent
nations," describing the relationship between native tribes and the
federal government, appeared to be changing. The "domestic,
dependent" aspect of the relationship was giving way to the "nation"
aspect of the phrase. At least that was what we here in Hawai'i
perceived was happening on the U.S. continent with the tribes. We
believed that we too were moving toward nationhood. That was the
vision. We thought we had time, time to educate, time to organize,
time to build consensus.
But it didn't happen. For various reasons, OHA's initial
promise was not fulfilled. One primary reason, of course, was that
OHA necessarily spent its first ten to fifteen years of existence trying
to wrest from the State its share of ceded lands revenues. 2  So, the
promise, the idea that we would be moving towards federal
recognition, towards a governmental relationship with the United
States, was compelling at the time but, ultimately, it failed. Indeed,
there was little agreement amongst Hawaiians that federal recognition
was necessary or desirable.
This was our situation at the time the Rice case was decided.
And where once federal recognition seemed like a choice - something
we could consider and move toward if we chose to, it now appears to
be a necessity if we are to survive. With the Rice decision there is a
new sense of urgency. But this sense of urgency is tinged with
apprehension and fear - fear that if we do not receive federal
recognition, the programs and laws that benefit Kanaka Maoli will no
longer exist.
Last night, in discussing federal recognition with Professor
Tsosie, she commented that she had not met anyone in Hawai'i that
actually viewed the federal recognition bill, the Akaka Bill,26 as a
25 See, e.g., Trustees of OHA v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446
(1987).
26 The Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2005, S. 147
and H.R. 309, currently pending in Congress, is commonly known as the Akaka
Bill, after Sen. Daniel K. Akaka its chief sponsor in the Senate.
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positive choice; instead it seemed people felt backed into a corner.
And she cautioned that we consider that very closely - you do not
want to act when you feel backed into a corner.
Ironically, from Professor Tsosie's keynote address last night,
it seems that even if Hawaiians were to achieve federal recognition
through the Akaka Bill or some other mechanism, the decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court indicate that the sovereignty of Indian nations -
limited as it is - may not survive the next twenty years. Thus we may
now be moving towards a status that ultimately will prove toothless
and ineffectual.
With this uncertain time ahead of us, and a justifiable history
of distrusting the law, what do we do with this He'e? There is another
'alelo no'eau about the He'e that gives us guidance:
Ka i 'apipili i ka lima.27
The fish that sticks to the hand.
The He'e will not go away, it is stuck to our hands and we must
handle it - with its slippery nature and its many arms, with its ability
to camouflage and obfuscate - and literally leave us spattered in ink.
We must handle it carefully, but as indigenous peoples, we must
handle it.
I conclude my remarks with an excerpt from Professor
Jonathon Osorio's article in the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics
entitled "Ku 'e and Ku 'oko 'a (Resistance and Independence): History,
Law, and Other Faiths. " 28 In that article, Professor Osorio compares
two initiatives advocating different approaches to sovereignty - the
Council of Regency of the Kingdom of Hawai'i and Ka Ldhui
Hawai'i. Although the approach of each organization is very
different, he concludes that some common ground may exist after all.
It is a rather long excerpt, but I thought it was very insightful and
relevant to this discussion of how indigenous peoples interact with the
law:
27 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 150, # 1379.
28 Jonathon Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, Ku 'e and Ku 'oko 'a (Resistance and
Independence): History, Law, and Other Faiths, 1 HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF LAW
AND POLITICS 92, at
http://www2.hawaii.edu/-hslp/journal/voll/Osorio Article (HJLP).pdf.
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Certainly all the major sovereignty initiatives have
proclaimed a faith in law and the electoral process.
This, in itself, is a telling reminder that our world has
changed, and significantly. One crucial aspect of law is
that it enables contending and competing groups within
a society to coexist, compensating for the lack of faith
between them by requiring that they place their faith in
law instead. Even if law may betray the weak and
helpless more often than it does the powerful, it may
be the only platform from which one group, no matter
how small, may fearlessly stake out its right to exist
and to endure.
However, placing faith in law requires that we
acknowledge a layer of authority other than custom
and tradition. This is an ideological razor's edge for
nationalists who see sovereignty as a protector of "the
Hawaiian culture." Law involves compromise - and
tradition can be so uncompromising. Nevertheless,
Hawaiians have already made the concession to trust in
law. Perhaps that should be the first thing on which we
can agree. We will certainly dispute many other things:
our read of history, the importance we attach to
ancestry, how we will live, and how we will treat
Americans and foreigners. Because we do not see these
things the same way now, let us fashion laws that will
enable us to act together in spite of it all.
Among all the conversions the Kanaka Maoli accepted
from America, the one that proved most unreliable was
the implicit promise accompanying the introduction of
western laws - that justice is possible. More than 160
years later, our willingness to drape our future onto a
legal frame demonstrates profound understandings of
law and history. Regardless of the fact that law has
changed the Native and may have created a being that
is not entirely like our ancestors, law has also been
made a part of our being, adopted and adapted to our
view of ourselves and the world. Our experience with
colonialism makes us wise in our understanding of the
limits and promise of law. We do understand the
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significance of bending to its authority. In a world
where other faiths are so carelessly deployed against
one another, humanity itself should prefer that a
genuine faith in history and law be desirable, useful,
and meaningful to all. That the imperialist can convey
this message as credibly as the conquered is doubtful.29
So what do we do with the law, with this He'e? As Professor Osorio
sees it, Hawaiians have already made the decision to place our faith in
the law. Having done so, we must also learn to handle the He'e, to
understand it, to embrace it, to change it - we must do all of those
things necessary to make it our own.
29 Id. at 112-13.
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"In the middle of the ocean
Is where my land is
That is where I
Will find what I'm searching for.
And one day I shall leave
But I shall return.
For I cannot depart from you,
These Mariana Islands. ' 2
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"Are you of Northern Marianas descent? If so, the land and resources
of Pagan belong to you as an indigenous person as guaranteed by the
Covenant Agreement that formed the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands. You can and should join PaganWatch in demanding
that your right to participate in the decisions over your island and
your resources are protected. Are you a CNMI citizen? If so, you can
and should object to the squandering of an opportunity that can
improve the lives of everyone in the CNMI. Are you a Chamorro
from Guam? If so then Pagan is part of your cultural and historic
ancestral lands and you should fight to keep Pagan from being
destroyed through careless management and exploitation.
'
"
3
"The new government of the CNMI has good intentions for its people.
It simply does not know how to fulfill those intentions."
4
I. INTRODUCTION
Rarely does heated controversy engulf an uninhabited island.
But that is what has happened to Pagan, the fifth largest island in the
Northern Mariana Islands chain, located approximately 3,800 miles
west of Honolulu, Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean. A volcanic eruption
in 1981, which drove Pagan's small resident population from the
island, deposited an estimated 200 million tons of volcanic pozzolan
ash on the island's surface.5 This pozzolan deposit, highly valued as a
2 The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) National
Anthem, reprinted in ARNOLD LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 519 (1989).
3 Chamorro.com, Disaster Threatens Pristine Pagan Island in the Northern
Marianas, at http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html.
4 Letter from Kenneth Moore, Chairman of Azmar International Inc., An
Open Letter, at
http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/20jan03-azmar-open-letter.html.
5 Chamorro.com, Disaster Threatens Pristine Pagan Island in the
Northern Marianas, at http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html.
See generally Western Pozzolan: Overview, at
http://www.westernpozzolancorp.com/overview.htm. The term "pozzolan" derives
from the ancient term "Pozzolana," referring to the volcanic ash found on the slopes
of Mt. Vesuvius, adjacent to the town of Pozzouli near the Bay of Naples. The
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cement additive, has become the center of a heated controversy
involving three main parties: the Marianas Public Land Authority
("MPLA"), the autonomous corporation with a constitutional
obligation to manage the public lands of the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands for the benefit of people of Northern
Marianas descent ("NMDs"); Azmar International Inc., an Arizona-
based company with designs on extracting the pozzolan; and
PaganWatch, a citizens' group opposing Azmar's proposal and
favoring locally managed, environmentally conscious extraction of
the pozzolan. The stakes are high. One estimate puts the value of
Pagan's pozzolan at fourteen billion dollars. 6 Although Pagan itself
remains a portrait of serenity, the players, as the PaganWatch web site
quoted above indicates, have staked out intensely partisan positions in
the battle for control of this resource. The controversy has exposed
MPLA to heightened scrutiny as to whether it is meeting its
constitutionally mandated fiduciary duty to manage the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' ("CNMI") public
lands for the "benefit of the people of the Commonwealth who are of
Northern Marianas descent."
7
The current battle for Pagan's pozzolan ash began in 2002
when Azmar first applied to MPLA for a permit. 8 Facing pressure
from proponents of the plan, including local legislators and the
governor, and vociferous opposition from PaganWatch and individual
citizens, the MPLA decision on whether to grant the permit soon
Romans discovered that pozzolan, when mixed with lime and water, produced
cement with hydraulic properties. Examples of structures built with durable
pozzolanic cement include the Roman Coliseum and Aqueducts, as well as the piers
of the Bay Bridge in San Francisco. See also Azmarlnternational.com, Pagan
Island Natural Pozzolanic Ash, at http://www.azmarintemational.com/product.htm
(stating that. pozzolan cement is stronger and offers reduced costs and emissions
compared to regular cement. A study conducted on Pagan's pozzolan deposit
indicates that it is of very high purity).
6 Chamorro.com, Disaster Threatens Pristine Pagan Island in the
Northern Marianas, at http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html.
7 COMMONWEALTH CONST. art. XI, § 4 (CNMI).
8 Liberty Dones, MPLA Allows Investor to Study Mt. Pagan Ashes, SAIPAN
TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2003, at http://www.saipantribune.com/archives; see also
Chamorro.com, at http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html.
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became front page news in the local newspapers. 9 In late 2003,
MPLA approved a limited-use permit for Azmar to conduct research
on the value of Pagan's pozzolan. 10  In response, PaganWatch
mounted a fierce campaign against the proposed permit, besieging the
newspapers with letters to the editor and launching its own website. 11
In the meantime, MPLA board members, along with three CNMI
legislators, held a private meeting with Azmar officials in April
2004.12 Allegations of financial insecurity and lack of mining
experience continued to receive coverage in the local press, with
opponents citing these and other reasons for MPLA to deny the permit
and Azmar's local spokesperson rebutting the accusations.1 3  In
August 2004, despite the recommendations of its staff to suspend
negotiations and put out a request for proposals, the MPLA board
granted approval to Azmar for a two-year conditional permit.1 4 This
permit required the company to submit detailed financial records
before final approval would be granted. 15 Despite Azmar's failure to
9 The CNMI has two local newspapers, the SAIPAN TRIBUNE and
MARIANAS VARIETY.
10 Mining Investor Seeks MPLA Action, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Apr. 12, 2004,
at http://www.saipantribune.com/archives.
11 See Chamorro.com, Disaster Threatens Pristine Pagan Island in the
Northern Marianas, at http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html#1,
for a sampling of various letters and e-mails submitted to local newspapers.
12 Gemma Q. Cassas, Arizona Company Renews Bidfor Pagan Ash,
MARIANAS VARIETY, Apr. 9, 2004, athttp://166.122.164.43/archive/2004/April/04-
09-12.htm.
13 See generally the following articles from the PaganWatch website, at
http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html. Pagan Community Says
No to Mining Permit, MARIANAS VARIETY, Apr. 16, 2004; Azmar Says It Can
Provide Capitalfor Pagan Project, MARIANAS VARIETY, May 12, 2004; In Defense
ofAzmar, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, May 26, 2004; CAER Withdraws Proposal to Mine
Pagan, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, May 27, 2004; More Distortionsfrom Azmar, SAIPAN
TRIBUNE, June 3, 2004; Suspend any Pozzolan Extraction without Study, SAIPAN
TRIBUNE, June 9, 2004; etc.
14 Agnes Donato, Azmar Gets Conditional OK, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Aug. 18,
2004, at http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat-1 &newsID-39685.
15 Id. MPLA ordered Azmar to submit: its most recent articles of
incorporation; the names of its incorporators, officers and shareholders, and how
much shares each of them holds; an audited financial statement; personal financial
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submit the necessary information, the MPLA Board in November
2004 agreed to a fifteen day, confidential negotiation period with the
company.16  Finally, in December 2004, the Board members
unanimously voted to reject Azmar's permit proposal, despite
individually stating "how much they wanted Azmar's mining project
to materialize," because of the company's continued failure or refusal
to provide the necessary financial documents.' 7 Despite this rejection,
Azmar insisted that negotiations were continuing and that the most
recent decision was the result of a "miscommunication." '1 8 Following
the passage on June 8, 2004, of CNMI Public Law 14-204, which
mandated the cessation of all negotiations pursuant to mining on
Pagan, MPLA established a task force to perform an in-depth study
on the pozzolan.1 9 Amidst this controversy, the only point on which
press coverage of the event seems to indicate any agreement among
the warring parties was unilateral dissatisfaction with MPLA.
The CNMI, like many other small island nations, possesses a
limited supply of land and natural resources. Total land area is 176.5
square miles, about four times the size of San Francisco.
20
statements of the shareholders; initial capital for Pagan mining; names of investors;
names of prospective buyers; and a letter of credit from a bank covered by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Id.
16 Gemma Q. Cassas & Ulysses Torres Sabuco, MPLA Agrees to
Negotiate with Azmar, MARIANAS VARIETY, Nov. 17, 2004, at
http://www.chamorro.com/community/news-archive/mv 1 7novO4.html.
17 Agnes Donato, Azmar Permit Junked, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Dec. 4, 2004,
at http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat-l&newsID-42474.
18 Agnes Donato, As Azmar Vows to Pursue Application, SAIPAN
TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 2004, at
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat 1&newsID-42511. Azmar
President Kenneth Moore insisted that all of the necessary documents had been
submitted and date-stamped prior to the deadline. He claimed that the documents
would be re-submitted to MPLA "as a reminder". Id.
19 Pozzolan Extraction Act, Pub. L. No. 14-204, § 2 (2004); see also
Agnes Donato, Team to Study Pagan's Pozzolan Formed, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Dec. 6,
2004, at http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat-I &newsID-42510.
MPLA board member Nicolas Nekai was appointed to chair the task force, which
was composed of MPLA officials, as well as representatives from the Legislature,
Northern Islands Mayor's Office, and other groups. Id.
20 See CNMI-Guide.com, Islands Information, at http://www.cnmi-
guide.com/info/essays/index.html.
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Recognizing this, the CNMI government, in negotiating the Covenant
with the United States during the 1970s and in formulating its
Constitution in 1976, took specific steps to safeguard this resource.
First, the Constitution restricted the sale of private land in the CNMI
21to NMDs. Second, it gave exclusive ownership of all public lands
to NMDs and entrusted management of the lands to two entities - the
Marianas Public Land Corporation ("MPLC") and the Marians Public
,,22Land Trust ("MPLT"). MPLC was tasked with public land
management, instituting a homestead program, and leasing remaining
public lands for commercial purposes." 23 MPLT was to manage the
financial side of the trust, with its five trustees prudentially investing
the revenues generated from MPLC's commercial leases of public
24lands. The board members of both MPLC and MPLT were to be
held to strict standards of fiduciary care in carrying out their
respective duties.25
Throughout the nearly thirty years of the CNMI's existence,
the entity in charge of the land management aspect of this trust has
taken on numerous formulations - from MPLC, to a division within
the Department of Land and Natural Resources, to the Board of
Public Lands, and now back to an "autonomous" corporation known
26as the Marianas Public Land Authority. Despite these changes in
structure, as the controversy over the allocation of Pagan's public land
indicates, there remain many unresolved issues in MPLA's
management of the public lands of the CNMI. Is the agency fulfilling
its constitutional mandate as a fiduciary to direct the affairs of the
corporation for the "benefit" of NMDs? What is meant by "strict
standards of fiduciary care" and what duties does this entail? Should
it involve only economic considerations or should other factors apply?
Do traditional trust law principles apply to the CNMI's public land
21 COMMONWEALTH CONST. art. XII, § 1 (CNMI).
22 Id. art. XI, §§ 4, 6.
23 Id. art. XI, § 5.
24 Id. art. XI, § 6.
25 Id. art. XI, §§ 4, 6.
26 See infra Section III, for an overview of the history of the public land
management entity.
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trust and are there any analogous trusts to provide guidance? Can
lessons learned by a comparable Hawaiian state agency, the
Department of Hawaiian Homelands, offer assistance in determining
the scope of MPLA's duty? Do judicial decisions by the Hawai'i and
CNMI supreme courts provide insight? Finally, what steps can
MPLA take to better carry out its fiduciary mission?
This paper will demonstrate that the scope of fiduciary duty
implicit in the management of the CNMI public lands is far stricter
than the CNMI Supreme Court and the various agencies responsible
for administering it have interpreted it to be. It will address this issue
in five parts. Part II provides a historical and political overview of the
CNMI. Part III examines the management of public lands as set forth
in the CNMI Constitution and subsequent legislation. Part IV is
divided into sub-parts: the first examines the reasons behind the
numerous changes in public land management, with special focus on
the mission and structure of the current MPLA; the second analyzes
the CNMI "hybrid" public land trust in light of traditional private,
charitable and public trust principles; the third examines the CNMI
Supreme Court's analysis of fiduciary duty in two key cases -
Govendo v. MPLC and Torres v. MPLC; the fourth scrutinizes
comparable trusts for guidance; and the fifth analyzes the fiduciary
duty of the Department of Hawaiian Homelands and analogizes it into
a higher standard of fiduciary duty for MPLA. Finally, Part V offers
some conclusions for implementing this higher standard for the
benefit of MPLA's NMD beneficiaries.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS - A HISTORY OF
COLONIAL OCCUPATION
The Northern Mariana Islands27 is a chain of fourteen islands
located approximately 1200 miles north of the equator in Micronesia,
a geographical region within Oceania.2 8  Comprised of over ten
27 The terms Northern Mariana Islands, Northern Marianas, Islands and
CNMI will be used interchangeably throughout the remainder of the paper.
28 Lydia Camacho-Romisher, The Regulatory Life Cycle and Regulatory
Concerns for the Utilities of the Northern Mariana Islands, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J.
569, 570 (2000) (citing DOUGLAS L. OLIVER, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 3, 76 [2d ed.
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thousand islands spread throughout the western Pacific Ocean,
Oceania is divided into three principal geographical divisions:
29Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia. Micronesia comprises the
northern section of Oceania and consists of over two thousand islands,
including the Mariana Islands. 30 The Marianas consist of Guam and
the Northern Marianas, distinct political entities with unique
affiliations with the United States. 3 1 The Northern Marianas extend
four hundred miles north from Guam and include Rota, Aguijuan,
Tinian, Saipan, Farallon de Medinilla, Anatahan, Sariguan, Guguan,
Alamagan, Pagan, Agrihan, Asuncion, Maug, and Farallon de
32Pajaros. The islands enjoy a tropical marine climate, with high
temperatures and humidity.
33
The inhabitants of the Northern Marianas experienced foreign
colonization and occupation for over 400 years. 34 "Discovered" by
Magellan in 1521 and colonized by Spain for the next 300 years, the
Islands became an important way station for Spanish ships as well as
an outpost for the spread of Christianity.35 Acts of genocide by the
Spanish in the late 17th century nearly eliminated the indigenous
1961]); see also ARNOLD LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 520-593 (1989).
29 See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 28, at 571. Polynesia consists of Hawai'i,
Western and American Samoa, Tonga, Niue and French Polynesia. Melanesia
consists of Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia.
Micronesia consists of Guam, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, the Caroline
Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Id.
30 Id. at 571.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 William H. Stewart, The CNMI Guide: Islands Information, at
http://www.cnmi-guide.com/info/.
34 Marie Rios-Martinez, Note, Congressional Colonialism in the Pacific:
The Case of the Northern Mariana Islands and its Covenant with the United States,
3 SCHOLAR 41, 42 (2000).
35 Id. at 46; see also Howard P. Willens & Deanne C. Siemer, AN
HONORABLE ACCORD: THE COVENANT BETWEEN THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (2002).
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Chamorro population.36  In 1815, a wave of immigrants from the
Caroline Islands, fleeing their typhoon-ravaged islands, settled in
Saipan.37 This accounts for the CNMI's dual indigenous population
of Chamorros and Carolinians.
Spain sold the Northern Mariana and Caroline Islands to
Germany in 1899 for $4.5 million.38 Germany briefly colonized the
islands, instituting agriculture, fishing, and coconut production to
sustain the Islands' economy.39 The Germans' tenure was short lived
as the Japanese navy seized the islands in 1914 after declaring war on
Germany.40 Under Japan's occupation, which lasted until 1945, the
indigenous population was forced to labor in the sugarcane fields and
to speak Japanese. 4 1 By 1936, the fishing and sugarcane industries
were flourishing, and the Islands had become a key strategic military
base for the Japanese military.
42
By the time of World War II, almost thirty thousand Japanese
troops were garrisoned on Saipan and Tinian.43  American forces
invaded Saipan on June 15, 1944, beginning one of the fiercest and
deadliest battles of the war.44 Approximately 66,000 Japanese troops
and civilians, 400 indigenous citizens, and 5,000 Americans perished
36 Rios-Martinez, supra note 34, at 46 (citing Donald F. McHenry,
MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 5 (1975)); see also William H. Stewart, The CNMI
Guide: Islands Information, at http://www.cnmi-guide.com/info/.
37 Stewart, supra note 36.
38 See Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 573 (citing Harold F. Nufer,
MICRONESIA UNDER AMERICAN RULE: AN EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC
TRUSTEESHIP (1947-77) 3-10, 26-30 (1978)).
39 Rios-Martinez, supra note 34, at 46.
40 See Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 574 (citing Nufer, supra note
37 at 10).
41 Rios-Martinez, supra note 34, at 46 (citing to a Telephone Interview
with Rosa Lizama Taisacan, Resident of the Northern Mariana Islands (Oct. 1,
1999)).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
10 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL; Vol. 7, Issue 2 (Summer 2006)
during the battle for the Marianas. The Islands were officially
secured in July of 1944, a key strategic victory for the Americans. On
August 6, 1945, an American B-29 bomber named the Enola Gay
flew from the Tinian airstrip to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
46
On August 15, 1945, the Japanese Emperor surrendered to Allied
forces, leaving the Islands in control of American forces.
47
B. PRE-COVENANT STATUS: THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS AS PART OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE
PACIFIC ISLANDS
The Allied countries established the United Nations ("U.N.")
shortly before the end of World War II.48 One of the U.N.'s stated
goals was to restore the right of self-determination to colonies and
territories occupied during the war.4 9  The U.N. created an
International Trusteeship System, which placed the colonized nations
"under the administration of independent countries that were
obligated to help the colonies transition to self-government." 5 The
U.N. designated all of Micronesia the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands ("TTPI") and placed it under the administration of the United
51States. For nearly two decades, the U.S. exerted absolute authority
over the islands, restricting entry and establishing a strong military
45 Sally Apgar, Enola Gay pilot visits Pearl Harbor, HONOLULU STAR-
BULLETIN, June 11, 2004, at http://starbulletin.com/2004/06/11 /news/story2.html.
46 David Moore, The Battle of Saipan The Final Curtain, at
http://www.battleofsaipan.com/seabee.htm.
47 Id.
48 Rose Cruz Cuison, The Construction ofLabor Abuse in the Mariana
Islands as Anti-American, 6 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61, 68 (2000).
49 Id.
50 Id. (citation omitted).
5' Id. The TTPI imposed specific duties on the United States, including
encouraging the residents to establish political institutions, to participate in
government, and to strive towards self-government or independence. Id. See also
Leibowitz, supra note 24, at 488 (describing the United States' role as administrator
of the TTPI).
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foothold in the region. 52 Little was done to foster economic growth
and the islands of the TTPI languished economically.53
In the 1960s, perhaps due to dissatisfaction with the U.S.'s
administration of the TTPI, Micronesians began to discuss with the
United States the prospects for self-governance. 54  This led to the
formation of the Congress of Micronesia, which petitioned the United
States to help promote self-determination in Micronesia. 55 In July of
1969, the Congress of Micronesia created the ten-person Political
Status Delegation to represent Micronesia in discussions with the
56United States. The U.S.-Micronesia negotiations began in October
of 1969 but substantial disagreements over land issues inhibited
progress.57 The Micronesians stressed the "special significance of
land in their small islands and insisted that they have unqualified
control over landownership and use."58  They demanded the
opportunity to renegotiate all existing land relationships within the
TTPI.59  In addition, differences emerged regarding the degree of
self-governance, with the U.S. resisting various restrictions on its
authority urged by the Micronesians. In October of 1969, the first
round of negotiations ended in an impasse.
61
During the second round of negotiations in 1970, the
Micronesian Political Status Delegation announced four non-
negotiable principles with respect to a future relationship with the
52 Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 574 (2000).
53 Id.
54 Cuison, supra note 48, at 69 (citing Don A. Farrell, HISTORY OF THE
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 558-72 (Phillis Koontz ed., Public School System
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 1991)).
55 Rios-Martinez, supra note 34, at 49.
56 Willens & Siemer, supra note 35, at 18.
57 Id.
51 Id. at 19.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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United States: first, that Micronesian sovereignty resided in the
people of Micronesia and its government; second, that Micronesian
people possessed the right to self-government and had the right to
choose independence or free association with any nation; third, that
the Micronesian people had the right to adopt their own constitutions;
fourth, that free association should be in the form of a compact,
unilaterally terminable by either party.62 Contrary to this declaration,
the representatives of the Northern Marianas indicated a desire to
enter into a close political relationship with the United States.
63
Although initially opposed to fragmentation of the Trust Territory, the
U.S. agreed to separate negotiations with the Northern Marianas
64delegation in 1972. In February 1975, after long and arduous
negotiations, the parties reached agreement on the Covenant To
Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America ("Covenant").65
C. THE COVENANT
On June 17, 1975, the people of the Northern Mariana Islands
approved the Covenant by a plebiscite vote of 78.8%.66 It passed both
67houses of the U.S. Congress by a joint resolution. On March 24,
62 Id. at 20.
63 Cuison, supra note 48 at 69 (citing Farrell, supra note 53, at 61).
64 Rios-Martinez, supra note 34 at 49.
65 Cuison, supra note 48, at 70. It should be noted that, when discussing
the Covenant, the CNMI Constitution and past legislation, verb tense usage may
vary depending on the status of the document. As much as possible, the author has
tried to remain consistent in tense usage while also conveying whether the law is
current or repealed.
66 Id. (citing Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the
Plebiscite in the Mariana Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June
1975, U.N. TCOR, 43 Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 34, U.N. Doc. T/1770 (1976) (reporting
that 78.8 percent of the registered indigenous people voted to approve the
Covenant); Ninety-five percent of the people of the Northern Mariana Islands
eligible to vote and ninety-five percent of these voted. See S. REP. No. 94-596, at 5
(1976)).
67 See Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (codified in 48
U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)) [hereinafter Covenant].
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1976, President Gerald Ford enacted the Covenant into law by signing
the joint resolution.68 While several of the provisions went into effect
immediately, the entire agreement did not go into full effect until
November 3, 1986, making the residents of the Northern Mariana
Islands United States citizens and the newest members of the
American family.69 For the first time in four centuries, the people of
the Northern Marianas had exercised their right of self-determination
by negotiating and approving a political arrangement with the United
States.
71
The Covenant created a self-governing Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI") in permanent political union
with the United States. 7 1 Although patterned after the agreements
between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, as well as the relationship between
the U.S. and Guam, the Covenant contained unique provisions not
present in either of the other two agreements. 72  The agreement
establishes the scope of the political relationship with the U.S. and
provides guidelines to assist the CNMI in achieving self-
governance.73 The political structure of the CNMI is modeled after
68 Id.
69 See Proclamation No. 5564, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,399 (November 7, 1986),
reprinted in 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
70 Cuison, supra note 48, at 71.
71 See generally Covenant, supra note 67.
72 Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 575 (citing MARIANAS POL.
STATUS COMM'N, SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE COVENANT TO ESTABLISH
A COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 2 (1975)).
73 Id. Key elements of the Covenant provide for:
* The commitment of the U.S. to assist the government of the
CNMI to achieve a higher standard of living for its people and to
develop the economic resources needed to meet the financial
obligations of local self-government;
" The formulation and amendment of a constitution of, for, and by
the people of the Northern Mariana Islands;
" Establishment of a republican form of government with
legislative, executive, and judicial branches;
* Guidelines for citizenship and nationality;
* Judicial authority and jurisdiction;
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the political structure of the United States -- a system of checks and
balances ensuring the citizens of the various islands a form of equal
representation. 74 There is a central government on Saipan with an
elected Governor, an executively appointed administration, bicameral
Legislature, and a judicial system composed of a superior and a
supreme court.75 Elected mayors head local island governments for
Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and the Northern Islands.
76
Just as they had been for the Micronesian status negotiations,
property issues were a critical and difficult component of the
Covenant discussions.77 Article VIII states that, upon signing of the
Covenant, all Northern Marianas land that had been part of the Trust
Territory would transfer to the newly created CNMI government upon
the cessation of the Trust.78  The agreement reserved to the U.S.
government, by lease, 20,000 acres on Tinian and Saipan for defense
purposes. 79 Finally, section 805 recognized the importance of land
" Applicability of United States constitutional and statutory
provisions including the CNMl's exemption from federal
inmmigration, customs, and minimum wage laws;
" The creation of the CNMI's own revenue and taxation system
* The availability of federal financial assistance;
* Transition of land title from the TTPI to the CNMI and the
availability of CNMI lands for federal leasing;
* Recognition of the scarcity and special importance of land
resources to the people of the CNMI;
" Representation of the CNMI by its own official in the U.S.
Congress; and
" Regular consultation between the CNMI and U.S. on all matters
affecting the relationship
74 Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 576.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 577.
77 Willens & Siemer, supra note 34, at 177-78.
78 See Covenant, supra note 67, § 801.
79 Id. at § 802. Section 802 set aside for lease by the U.S. government
nearly 20,000 acres of land on Tinian, Saipan and Farallon de Medinilla. Id. The
one-time payment for these leases, consisting of nearly $20 million, constituted the
original investment in MPLT. Id. The lease was for 50 years, with a U.S. option
for another 50. Id.
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ownership for the culture and traditions of the people of the Islands.
80
It set forth restrictions on the ownership and alienation of public and
private lands in order to protect the CNMI people from exploitation
and to promote their economic advancement and self-sufficiency.
81
Article II of the Covenant required the people of the Northern
Marianas to formulate and approve a Constitution. 82 Because this
paper focuses on specific provisions for public land management, the
Constitution will be examined in the next subsection, entitled "Public
Land Management in the CNMI."
D. CURRENT DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE CNMI
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the CNMI has a
population of nearly 70,000 people, an increase of over seventeen
percent from 1995 figures. 83  Of the fourteen islands, only Rota,
Tinian, and Saipan are substantially populated. 84 Saipan, the capital
and largest of the islands, has a land area of 47.5 square miles and is
home to almost ninety percent of the Northern Marianas Islands'
population. 85  Rota and Tinian have a combined land area of 72
square miles and less than 7,000 residents. 86 The rest of the islands,
collectively known as the Northern Islands, are either sparsely
inhabited or uninhabited. 87 The indigenous population of CNMI is
composed of Chamorros and Carolinians totaling 25% of the
80 Id. at § 805.
81 Id.
82 See Covenant, supra note 67, § 201.
83 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION AND HOUSING PROFILE:
2000, THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/island/CNMIprofile.pdf [hereinafter CNMI
Census].
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
17 Id. Pagan is a part of the Northern Islands.
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population.8 8  Asians, mainly from China and the Philippines,
comprise over 55% of the total population. Other Pacific Island
ethnicities, such as Chuukese, Pohnpeians, and Palauans, comprise
nearly 7%.89 U.S. mainland Caucasians and African-Americans total
less than 2%.90
The CNMI economy is supported primarily by taxes generated
by tourism, garment manufacturing, service companies, and retail
stores. 91  Of these, the tourism and garment industries form the
backbone of the Northern Marianas' economy. Annual tourism
arrivals number more than 500,000 with revenues of over $600
million.92 The garment industry is the Islands' largest employer, with
over 17,500 employees. 93  Temporary foreign workers comprise
approximately 58% of the total CNMI population.
94
A 1999 estimate places the total employed labor force at
46,590. 95  Of this total, nearly 75% are non-U.S. citizen contract
workers.9 6  The economy is fragile and is primarily influenced by
outside markets. 97  The CNMI government, which employs the
majority of the local population, is highly dependent on the tax
revenue generated by the tourism and garment sectors. Many
88 Id.
89 CNMI Census, supra note 83, at 2.
90 Id.
91 Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 573.
92 Commonwealth Development Authority, at
http://www.cda.gov.mp/tourism.htm.
93 Burger & Comer, P.C., CNMI Garmet Industry Economic Report 3
(October 3, 2000), at http://www.sgma-saipan.org/stats/er 00.htm. The garment
industry in the CNMI has traditionally enjoyed two advantages: tariff-free access to
the U.S. market and a low minimum wage of just over three dollars per hour. See
id. at 4-5.
94 Id.
95 Burger & Comer, supra note 93, at 3.
96 Id.
97 Camacho-Romisher, supra note 28, at 573.
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commentators believe that the January 1, 2005 abolition of the 1974
Multifibre Agreement, which imposed a system of production quotas
on the textile industry, will lead to the dissolution of the CNMI's
garment industry within the next few years. 98  The loss of tax
revenues from the garment industry is expected to further exacerbate
the already tenuous financial position of the CNMI government.99 In
this economic climate, pressure to tap into new sources of revenue,
including the Islands' land and natural resources, is likely to mount.
This background is critical to bear in mind when considering the
Pagan mining issue. The conception of MPLA as an "autonomous"
corporate entity, free from outside influence, does not mesh with the
economic and political pressures on the ground level.
III. PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE CNMI
Beginning with the enactment of the CNMI Constitution in
1978 and continuing to the present, public land management in the
CNMI has taken on many forms and has been the subject of numerous
pieces of legislation. The following section provides a brief overview
of this complex, often indiscernible, history.
A. THE CNMI CONSTITUTION - SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR
LAND ALIENATION AND PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT
The Commonwealth Constitution was drafted by thirty-nine
elected delegates meeting in a constitutional convention on Saipan
from October 18 through December 6, 1976.100 CNMI voters ratified
98 See Guy de Jonquieres, Garment Industry Faces a Global Shakeup, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 19, 2004, at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id-4269. The Multifibre Agreement was
formally established in 1974 by the U.S., Europe and other wealthy countries to
limit the flow of imports from developing countries as a means of safeguarding jobs
in developed nations from being shipped overseas. Id. In short, its cessation ended
the quota system that had traditionally restricted flows of clothing and textiles from
Asian countries. China is expected to be the biggest winner because the country's
efficient, large-scale, and low-cost operations are expected to give it a significant
advantage in the new world market. Id.
99 See e.g. James Brooke, Apparel Factories in Saipan are Threatened by
the End of Quotas, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 12, 2005, at Finance 11.
100 See Willens & Siemer, supra note 35, at 347.
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it on March 6, 1977 and it became effective January 9, 1978.101 The
U.S. government retained the right of final approval, based on the
CNMI Constitution's consistency with the Covenant and the U.S.
Constitution, treaties, and laws applicable to the Northern
Marianas.10 2  In keeping with the Covenant's recognition of the
importance of land to the people of the Islands, special provisions
dealing with land and natural resources were included.10 3  In many
ways, the CNMI Constitution mirrors the U.S. Constitution, setting
forth a bill of rights, a due process clause, and a provision for eminent
domain.1 0 4 In other ways, however, it diverges significantly. For
instance, as part of the bill of rights, the CNMI Constitution
guarantees the right of every person to a "clean and healthful public
environment in all areas, including the land, air and water."'10 5 In
addition, Article XII, Section 1 limits the acquisition of long-term
interests in land to NMDs.10 6 Article XIV, Section 1 protects all
places of importance to the culture, traditions, and history of the
people of the Northern Mariana Islands.10 7  Finally, Article XI,
Section 1 provides that the CNMI's public lands belong "collectively
to the people of the Commonwealth who are of Northern Marianas
descent" and establishes a unique, two-entity mechanism for
management of this trust, composed of MPLC and MPLT.108
B. THE MARIANAS PUBLIC LAND CORPORATION
MPLC had five directors, appointed by the Governor with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 10 9 There was at least one director
101 Id. at 347, 349.
102 Id. at 348.
103 See CNMI CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
104 See generally id. art. I.
105 Id. art. XI, § 9.
106 Id. art. XII, § 1.
107 See CNMI CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
108 Id. art. XI, § 1. The two mechanisms were MPLC and MPLT.
109 Id. art. XI, § 4.
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from each of the main islands, and at least one woman and one
Carolinian on the board. 110 Directors were required to be U.S.
citizens with clean criminal records and at least two years of
management experience, residents of the CNMI for a minimum of
five years, and of Northern Marianas descent.111 They also had to
speak either Chamorro or Carolinian. 112 The directors served four-
year terms, with the exception of the first two appointed, who served
only two years. 113  MPLC was provided all the powers of a
corporation under Commonwealth law and required an affirmative
vote of a majority of the directors to act. 114 The directors had to
submit annual written reports to the people of the CNMI describing
the management of public lands, the effects of transfers of interests in
public land made during the preceding year, and disclosing the
interests of the directors in Commonwealth land.115 Finally, MPLC
was to be dissolved after the Constitution had been in effect for
twelve years and its functions transferred to the executive branch of
the government.
116
The Constitution set forth fundamental policies for MPLC.
117
First, MPLC had to make a portion of public lands available for a
homestead program. 118 Second, the corporation could not transfer a
freehold interest in public land until twenty-five years after the
effective date of the Constitution (1978), except for homesteads, use
by another public agency, or for land exchanges to accomplish a
legally authorized public purpose. 119 Third, the corporation could not
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. The author was unable to determine the reasoning behind this
provision.
117 Id. art. XI, § 5.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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transfer a leasehold interest in public lands exceeding twenty-five
years including renewal rights. 12  Fourth, any lease of public land
exceeding five hectares for commercial purposes had to be approved
by the Legislature in a joint session. 121  Fifth, MPLC could not
transfer an interest in public land located within 150 feet of the high
water mark of a sandy beach, except the corporation could authorize
construction of facilities for public purposes. 122 Sixth, the corporation
had to adopt a comprehensive public land use plan including priority
of uses. 23 Finally, at the end of each fiscal year, MPLC was to
transfer all moneys from the management of public lands to MPLT,
minus the amount necessary to meet reasonable expenses of
administration. 124 MPLT was to be administered by three trustees
appointed by the Governor with input from the Senate. 125 They were
to "make reasonable, careful and prudent investments" and were held
to strict standards of fiduciary care.126
C. POST-MPLC MANAGEMENT OF CNMI PUBLIC LANDS
1. PUBLIC LAW 10-57 ESTABLISHES THE DIVISION OF
PUBLIC LANDS
As proscribed by the Constitution, in 1990, the MPLC was
eliminated by Executive Order 94-3, and management of public lands
was brought under the Department of Land and Natural Resources
("DLNR"). 127 In 1997, the Legislature passed Public Law 10-57,
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 id.
124 Id.
125 Id. art. XI, § 6.
126 Id.
127 Exec. Order No. 94-3, 1 C.M.C. § 2001, Commission Comment
(2004).
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establishing a separate Division of Public Lands ("DPL") and Board
of Public Lands ("BPL") under DLNR. The Legislature found that
"control over public lands is too important a function to the people of
the Commonwealth to be left simply to a line department under direct
control of the Governor."' 128 Furthermore, the Legislature found that
public land management needed to be overseen by an autonomous
board to "bring a broader and more independent perspective to the
critical issues of land management." 129 DPL was to be headed by a
director serving under control of the Secretary of DLNR and the
Board.1 30 DPL was designated as the successor to MPLC and the
constitutionally imposed duties and policies remained in-tact. 
31
Public Law 10-57 did, however, make significant changes to
the management scheme of public land management. It adopted six
Additional Fundamental Policies ("AFP") to be given "separate and
independent force and effect as statutory law apart from their vitality
as constitutional provisions."' 132 The first three AFPs stated that DPL
could not transfer or lease an interest in less than five hectares of
public land for commercial purposes to any holder of an interest in
contiguous or adjoining land if the combination would total more than
five hectares without approval by a joint session of the Legislature.1 33
AFP #4 prohibited DPL from altering leases subject to legislative
approval. 134 AFP #5 placed restrictions and requirements on land
exchanges with private companies for the purpose of maximizing the
return on public lands and preventing private parties from "reaping
windfall gains from land exchanges at the expense of the
128 Public Lands and Natural Resources Act of 1997, Pub. L. 10-57, § 2.
This law was subsequently amended by P.L.s 11-48, 12-33 and 12-71. It is unclear
from the Commonwealth Code which provisions of P.L. 10-57 are still in effect.
129 Id.
130 id.
131 See generally Public Lands and Natural Resources Act of 1997, Pub. L.
10-57.
132 Id. at § 2674.
133 Id. at § 2675.
134 Id.
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Commonwealth." 135  AFP #6 imposed a thirty day public notice
requirement for any lease of public land for commercial purposes.136
Although unclear due to the absence of legislative history on P.L. 10-
57, these additional fundamental policies apparently were intended to
address perceived problems with MPLC's adherence to its fiduciary
responsibilities. The AFPs place numerous controls on DPL's ability
to dispose of public lands, including increased involvement on the
part of the Legislature and limitations on private gain from transfers
of public land.
2. PUBLIC LAW 11-48 AMENDS P.L. 10-57
In 1998, the CNMI Legislature passed Public Law 11-48
amending P.L. 10-57.137 The Legislature found that "the best
guarantee of protecting and preserving places of importance to the
culture, traditions, and history of the people of the Northern Mariana
Islands is to ensure that management of these places, to the maximum
extent possible, be first offered to persons of Northern Marianas
descent." 138 The law required DPL to make good faith efforts to lease
public lands to persons of Northern Marianas descent.' 3 9 Only after
such efforts had been made could DPL then open the lands to other
135 Id.
136 Id. The notice had to be by publication for four consecutive weeks in
a locally circulated newspaper and by postings in the civic center and local
government offices. Id. Required components included: 1) a description of the
property, 2) the proposed lessee, 3) the names of any agents, representatives or
attorneys involved in negotiating on behalf of the lessee, 4) a concise statement of
the terms and conditions of the proposed lease, 5) identification of all alternative
proposals received during the previous five years, and 6) the time, place and manner
in which interested persons could present their views. Id.
137 See generally An Act to Amend Section 2674 of Public Law 10-57 in
order to further Protect and Preserve Places Important to the Culture, Traditions and
History of the People of the Northern Mariana Islands; and for other Purposes, Pub.
L. 11-48, at www.cnmilaw.org/public-lawsl .php.
138 Id. § 1.
139 Id.
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persons or corporations. 140 P.L. 11-48 codified this provision as an
amendment to the AFPs of P.L. 10-57.141
3. PUBLIC LAW 12-33 AMENDS P.L. 10-57
On December 5, 2000, House Bill No. 12-257, entitled "Board
of Public Lands Act of 2000," was passed by the Commonwealth
Legislature and signed into law as Public Law 12-33 by Governor
Pedro Tenorio. 42 The Legislature found that a conflict of interest
existed with the placement of DPL and BPL within DLNR because
the Secretary, serving at the pleasure of the Governor, had to
implement the policies of the administration while also implementing
the policies of DPL and its Board.1 43 The Legislature hoped to end
this potential conflict of interest by removing DPL from DLNR and
establishing it within the Executive Branch as an independent Board
of Public Lands.1 44 BPL would oversee the Office of Public Lands,
headed by a Public Lands Administrator, to implement and enforce
the policies of the Board. 45  The language of P.L. 11-48 was
eliminated.
146
The new law was not universally embraced, as the Governor's
letter announcing its enactment reveals. 147 In it, he states that it is
"difficult to foresee whether this is the best route to resolve the
problems that we have encountered and continue to encounter under
140 Id.
141 Id. § 2.
142 Governor Pedro Tenorio, letter accompanying signing of Pub. L. 12-33,
December 5, 2000 (on file with author).
143 Board of Public Lands Act of 2000, Pub. L. 12-33, § 2 (2000), at
http://www.cnmilaw.org/pdf/public-laws/12/pl12-33.pdf.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See id.
147 Governor Pedro Tenorio, supra note 142.
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Public Law 10-57., 148 He also had constitutional concerns with
respect to establishing an independent board to carry out executive
functions but left this interpretation to the judiciary. 149 Eventually, he
signed the bill into law while simultaneously urging the Legislature to
improve it at a later time.
1 50
Other significant changes included the lessening of the notice
requirement for all public land leases. 51  The new law required
fifteen days' notice by unspecified means. 152 Alternative proposals
did not have to be considered unless previously solicited by public
notice.1 53  Additionally, P.L. 12-33 introduced a more thorough
provision for the calculation of rental fees, setting minimum annual
rent payments for all public land leases at no less than 8% of
appraised fair market value.'
1 54
4. PUBLIC LAW 12-71 AMENDS P.L. 10-57 AND P.L. 12-33
Public Law 12-71, passed on November 13, 2001, shortly after
P.L. 12-33 by the same Legislature, amended the law yet again.
Leaving the majority of P.L. 12-33 unaltered, it established the
Marianas Public Land Authority as an independent public corporation
within the Executive branch. 155  Rather than a Public Lands
Administrator, the new law called for MPLA to be headed by a Board
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See Board of Public Lands Act of 2000, supra note 143, § 105(f)(1).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. § 106(d).
155 An Act to Make Amendments to the Board of Public Lands Act of
2000, Pub. L. 12-71, 1 CMC § 101(a) (2001), at
http://www.cnmilaw.org/pdf/public-laws/12/pl12-71.pdf.
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of Directors headed by a Commissioner and comprised of Deputy
Commissioners for each senatorial district.
156
In addition to yet another change in structure, MPLA was
given substantially more discretion to manage a support staff and
negotiate lease rates.1 57 Rather than the 8% minimum established by
P.L. 12-33, the MPLA Board could now negotiate leases at a rate not
less than 2% of current fair market value in "consideration of the
current economic condition of the Commonwealth. '' 158  P.L. 12-71
provided a complicated mechanism whereby the lease amount would
be brought up to the 8% level through a series of yearly increases.
1 59
Thus, four sources form the basis of current MPLA structure
and policy: Public Laws 12-33 and 12-71, the Constitution and the
Covenant. 160  It should be noted that the current edition of the
Commonwealth Code Reporter makes numerous mentions of the
"technical deficiencies" of P.L. 12-71, casting some doubt on its
legality.
1 61
156 Id.
157 Id. § 102.
158 Id. § 101(a). Although not stated in the legislative history, the impetus
behind this provision was presumably to enhance the Board's ability to attract
commercial investment through lower lease rates. At the time, the CNMI was
suffering financially as a result of the Asian economic crisis, which severely
impacted its tourism revenues.
159 See An Act to Make Amendments to the Board of Public Lands Act of
2000, supra note 155, § 106.
160 MPLA, at http://www.mpla.gov.mp/About /%20MPLA/php.
161 1 C.M.C. § 2801, Commission Comment, (year of code unknown)
reads:
PL 12-71 became effective November 13, 2001 and
contained some technical deficiencies, the first
deficiency is the amendment of subsection (a) above
without conforming amendments to subsection (b) and
the remainder of the act; a global amendment provision
was not included in PL 12-71. Additionally, the
reference in subsection (a) above to the term of the
Board of Directors is unclear and also in conflict with 1
C.M.C. § 2803 (d). Furthermore, it appears that in the
last sentence of subsection (a) above, the reference to
"offected" should have been "affected." Finally, the
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE CNMI FROM MPLC
TO MPLA
As summarized by the previous section, the brief history of
public land management in the CNMI is marked by the recognition of
the importance of fiduciary management with a corresponding series
of failures to achieve this goal. Despite numerous legislative efforts,
the underlying problem has yet to be successfully resolved. The next
section analyzes the reasons underlying this recurring issue and then
examines the structure of the current iteration of public land
management in the CNMI: the Marianas Public Land Authority.
1. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND
DECLINING PUBLIC OPINION
162
A closer look at the language of the numerous public laws
modifying the structure of the public land management agency reveals
an ongoing theme of legislative dissatisfaction with the management
of CNMI public lands. For example, P.L. 10-57 contains a reference
to the "conflict of interest" of having the management function
directly under the executive branch.1 63 P.L. 11-48, with its leasing
preference for NMDs, appears to address the perception that the
Division of Public Lands was favoring non-CNMI investors and not
accounting for the preservation of lands with historic and cultural
value. 164 The hodgepodge nature of the current law reveals a split in
reference in PL 12-67 to "H.B. 12-257" should instead
be to "PL 12-33."
162 It is critical to note before beginning this discussion that a full analysis
is difficult. CNMI legislative history is limited and the available materials contain
little in the way of actual legislative discussion. Furthermore, the nature of local
politics and the small size of the CNMI make most experts unwilling to speak on
the record. What follows is the author's best effort to summarize the changes and
the reasons behind them using the limited resources available.
163 See supra section (C)(1), for a discussion of the reasons behind the
passage of P.L. 10-57.
164 See generally An Act to Amend Section 2674 of Public Law 10-57 in
order to further Protect and Preserve Places Important to the Culture, Traditions and
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the Legislature's approach to public land management. While P.L.
12-33, with its strict lease calculation provisions, indicates an attempt
to stop sub-value leases, P.L. 12-71 gives much of this financial
strictness away by lowering the required lease amount to 2% of the
land's appraised value.' 65 Finally, 12-71 attempts, with its creation of
an "autonomous" corporation, to resolve what appears to be the
recurring theme throughout the history of public land management in
the CNMI: keeping the management entity free from external political
and financial pressures.'66
One of the many outside forces thought to have played a role
in many of the leasing decisions is the Legislature itself. An ex-
CNMI government official, stated that "many land transactions in the
past two decades fall short of being reasonable or conducive to
benefiting the intended beneficiaries."' 167 He alleges that many of the
leases requiring legislative approval (those exceeding five hectares)
were illegally influenced by current and former legislators for their
own private benefit. 68 Another CNMI resident claims that special
interests have prevented proper enforcement of existing leases and
that lease income has not been properly utilized to benefit NMDs
1 69
The letters and articles in the local newspapers during the Pagan
History of the People of the Northern Mariana Islands; and for other Purposes,
supra note 137.
165 See generally An Act to Make Amendments to the Board of Public
Lands Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 12-71, 1 C.M.C. § 101 (year of code unknown).
166 Id.
167 E-mail interview with anonymous source #1, to Blaine Rogers,
Student, University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law (March 25,
2005, 09:15:08 PST) (on file with author).
168 Id. See section 4(C) of text discussing Romisher v. MPLC, 1 N. Mar. I.
Commonw. Rptr. 843 (1983), infra note 223, and Govendo v. MPLC, N. Mar. I.
482, 487 (1992), infra note 232, for examples of conflict of interest allegations
against MPLC.
169 E-mail interview with anonymous source #2, to Blaine Rogers,
Student, University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law (March 28,
2005, 16:34:44) (on file with author).
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controversy provides additional insight into public opinion regarding
the failure of management of the CNMI's public lands. 
170
2. MPLA TODAY: MPLC RE-VISITED?
As previously stated, MPLA is an independent public
corporation allotted a high degree of discretion to manage the
CNMI's public land trust, in addition to other responsibilities.
MPLA's mission, as trustees for the public lands of the CNMI, is,
[T]o develop and implement a strategic land use plan
that promotes cultural and economic growth for the
benefit of our present and future generations. The plan
provides for the efficient and effective services in the
management, use, disposition and development of our
lands for the economic and social betterment of our
islands. 171 (emphasis added)
MPLA identifies its chief responsibilities as the creation and
implementation of a homesteading program, the commercial leasing
and permitting of idle public lands, designating public land parcels to
other government agencies for fulfillment of the public purpose, and
the settling of land claims through its Land Compensation Program.'
1 72
P.L. 13-17 ("The Land Compensation Act of 2002") added this last
responsibility as a result of the dwindling supply of public land in the
Commonwealth. 173 It authorizes MPLA to incur a public debt to
finance private land acquisitions for public purposes, such as public
roadways and utility easements. 174 Compensation may be in the form
of cash disbursements or land exchanges.
1 75
170 See generally the PaganWatch website, at
http://www.chamorro.com/community/pagan/pagan.html.
171 MPLA website, Mission Statement, at
http://www.mpla.gov.mp/About / 20MPLA/mission.php.
172 Id., Overview, at
http://www.mpla.gov.mp/About / 20MPLA/aboutmpla.php.
173 Id. See also Land Compensation Act of 2000, at
http://www.mpla.gov.mp/Land /%20Compensation/landcomp.php.
174 Id.
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Although MPLA has detailed rules in place for its Land
Compensation Program, it is unclear whether similar regulations exist
for the land leasing process.' 76 The CNMI Administrative Procedure
Act, which mirrors the U.S. APA, applies to MPLA and sets forth
rulemaking procedures.1 77 If the Pagan controversy is any indication,
however, there is little opportunity for the NMD beneficiaries of the
public land trust to effectively participate in and challenge the
decisions of the Board.
178
At the time of this writing, MPLA was utilizing the Land Use
Plan originally prepared in 1989.179 A 2005 draft was in progress but
not yet finalized.'1 80 Due to the dwindling inventory of public land, in
2002, MPLA placed an ongoing moratorium on the acceptance of
homestead applications for Saipan and Rota.1 81 A recent article in the
Marianas Variety indicates that over half of Saipan's public lands are
already leased or being used for government purposes.1 82  The
remaining unused lands are mostly located in mountainous areas,
rendering their use for homesteading or commercial leasing more
175 See supra note 173.
176 This information is not available on the website and numerous requests
and interviews have not uncovered any information. This is a ripe area for future
research as administrative process may have a direct bearing on the beneficiaries'
ability to have their interests recognized. Examples of possible regulations include
provisions for public hearings, contested case hearings, and judicial review.
177 CNMI Administrative Procedure Act, 9 C.M.C. §§ 9101-15 (2004).
178 See text in Section I regarding the Pagan mining controversy.
179 E-mail from Ed Arriola, Public Information Officer, Marianas Public
Land Authority, to Blaine Rogers, Student, University of Hawaii William S.
Richardson School of Law (Feb. 22, 2005, 12:13 PST) (on file with author).
180 Id.
181 See MPLA website, Homestead, at
http://www.mpla.gov.mp/homestead/homestead.php.
182 Gemma Q. Casas, Half of Saipan's Public Lands Already in Use,
MARIANAS VARIETY, Apr. 22, 2005. Of the 8,764 hectares of public land, 4,080
were already in use as of 2001. Id. Commercial leases comprise 1,273 hectares of
this total, with conservation and wildlife areas comprising 783 hectares. Id.
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difficult.183  There are over 3,500 homestead applications pending
with MPLA on Saipan alone.
184
B. THE CNMI's PUBLIC LAND TRUST
Although the CNMI's public land agency has changed form
throughout the years, the strict standards of fiduciary care owed by its
administrators to the NMD beneficiaries have not. Although it is not
entirely clear why or how the fiduciary duty has survived the
numerous legislative changes made to MPLC and its successors, it is
evident from MPLA's own mission statement that the fiduciary
standard originally set forth in the Constitution still applies to it. But
what is meant by "strict standards of fiduciary care" and what specific
requirements does it impose on MPLA? As the following section will
indicate, the CNMI public land trust is a "hybrid" of traditional
private and public trust doctrine. Its unique structure, involving two
separate management entities, MPLC (now MPLA) and MPLT,
provides a critical component for understanding the scope of MPLA's
fiduciary obligation.
1. OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL TRUST LAW
According to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,' 85 a trust is a
"fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a
manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting
the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for
the benefit of charity or for one or more persons."'1 86 Although the
183 Id.
184 id.
185 7 C.M.C. § 3401 states that the Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Trusts is the law of the Commonwealth in the absence of contrary Commonwealth
legislation. Section IV of this paper explores traditional trust law principles using
the Restatement Third. In the absence of an amendment to the Commonwealth
Code, it is unclear which edition a court would select for trust law interpretation.
186 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003); see also GEORGE G.
BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (rev. 2d ed.
1984) (defining "trust" as "a fiduciary relationship in which one person holds a
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trust relationship is one of many forms of fiduciary relationship, the
duties of a trustee are more rigorous than those of most other
fiduciaries.187 Within this framework, one characteristic is
entrenched: a person in a fiduciary relationship is under a duty to act
for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the
relationship. Other elements common to most fiduciary
relationships include a duty not to compete, a duty not to profit at the
expense of the other, a duty of loyalty, and a duty not to delegate the
performance of fiduciary duties.1 89 Thus, a traditional trust involves
three elements:
(1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is
subject to duties to deal with it for the benefit of one or
more others; (2) one or more beneficiaries, to whom
and for whose benefit the trustee owes the duties with
respect to the trust property; and (3) trust property,
which is held by the trustee for the beneficiaries.'
1 90
A trust may be created for private or charitable purposes, or for some
combination of the two.
191
a. PRIVATE TRUSTS
The general purpose of private trusts is "to benefit identified
or identifiable beneficiaries in accordance with their respective
property interest subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that interest for the
benefit of another"). The treatise then observes that "a fiduciary relation is one in
which the law demands of one party an unusually high standard of ethical and moral
conduct with reference to another" and that it "should be first noted that an interest
in property is always an element of the trust, ... [which] presupposes described,
ascertained or ascertainable property, a defined interest in which is to be owned or
held by the trustee." Id.
187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. § 27 cmt. in Subsection (2).
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interests in the trust."'1 92  The party establishing the trust has
considerable latitude in specifying the manner in which a trust
purpose is to be pursued. 193  In order to be valid, however,
administrative and other provisions must reasonably relate to the trust
purpose. 94  The reasons behind creation of a private trust are
limitless. Examples include the avoidance of probate, to providing
for successive enjoyment of property over several generations, to
"providing property management for those who cannot, ought not or
wish not to manage for themselves."'' 95 The traditional view of a
private trustee's fiduciary obligation is that it involves maximizing the
economic performance of the trust corpus.19 6  Wide discretion is
usually provided to the trustees in pursuit of this goal.
197
The CNMI public land trust incorporates the three elements of
a traditional trust - (1) trustees assigned to manage the trust property
for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries,
(2) beneficiaries (NMDs) for whose benefit the trustees owe duties
with respect to the trust property, and (3) trust property (all the
submerged and public lands of the CNMI) held by the trustees for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. It resembles a private trust in that it was
created to benefit identifiable beneficiaries. Additionally, property
management is a common function of private trusts, especially for
those beneficiaries unable to manage it themselves. Practically
speaking, it would be impossible for the named beneficiaries of the
CNMI trust, an ever-increasing group of NMDs, to manage the lands
on their own accord. While very useful, the analogy to private trust
law, however, is undermined by the fact that the trust property at issue
here is publicly-owned and managed for a charitable purpose.
192 id.
193 id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Interview with Randall Roth, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson
School of Law (Apr. 13, 2005).
197 Id.
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b. CHARITABLE TRUSTS
A trust purpose is charitable "if its accomplishment is of such
social interest or benefit to the community as to justify permitting the
property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity and to justify the
various other special privileges that are typically allowed to charitable
trusts.' 198 Since the interests of the community vary with time and
place, there is no fixed standard to determine what purposes are of
such interest to the community. 199  The fundamental distinction
between private and charitable trusts is that, in the case of a private
trust, property is devoted to the use of specified persons designated as
beneficiaries of the trust; in the case of a charitable trust, property is
devoted to purposes the law deems appropriately beneficial to the
public.z 0 Charitable trust purposes include: (1) the relief of poverty;
(2) the advancement of knowledge or education; (3) the advancement
of religion; (4) the promotion of health; (5) governmental or
municipal purposes; and (6) other purposes that are beneficial to the
201community. It is common for charitable trusts to limit direct
benefits to persons of particular national origin or other characteristics
or background. z2
The CNMI's public land trust's likeness to a charitable trust is
clear. First, its purpose is "public" in that it was designed to benefit
all NMDs.203 Critical to this notion is the understanding that, at the
time of the formulation of the CNMI Constitution, NMDs were one in
the same as the general "public." 20 4 In addition, the purpose of the
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 gen. cmt. a (2003).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003).
202 Id. at gen. cmt. f.
203 CNMI CONST. art. XI, §4.
204 Interview with Jon Van Dyke, Professor of Law, William S.
Richardson School of Law (Apr. 15, 2005). However, due to the dramatic shifts in
population demographics over the past 20 years the people of Northern Marianas
descent are now minorities on their own islands. See CNMI Census, supra note 83.
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205trust is so vital that it is devoted in perpetuity. Finally, it limits its
beneficiaries to those of a particular national origin.20 6 This charitable
trust model, however, while helpful, is still inadequate for our
purposes.
c. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine emanates from a long history of
Roman and English law's treatment of the nature of property rights in
rivers, the sea, and the seashore.20 7  In essence, the doctrine
recognizes that certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, had
traditionally been preserved for the benefit of the public, and property
used for these purposes was distinguished from general public
208property, which the sovereign could grant to private owners. In
certain common properties, such as the seashore, highways, and
running water, "'perpetual use was dedicated to the public.'
20 9
Traditionally, the public trust imposed three restrictions on
governmental authority: "first, the [trust] property... must not only
be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by
the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a
fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must be maintained for
particular types of uses., 2 10  How these restrictions have been
interpreted and applied varies markedly among jurisdictions in the
United States. 2 11 The public trust doctrine exists independently of
statutory protections and, in some states, has been elevated to a
205 See generally CNMI CONST. art. XI.
206 Id.
207 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
208 Id.
209 Id. (quoting W. HUNTER, ROMAN LAW, 311 (4 t' ed. 1903)).
211 Id. at 477.
211 See generally Sax, supra note 207, 491-523.
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212constitutional mandate. The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches all play roles in protecting the public trust resources for
present and future generations due to the lack of designated
trustees. 2 13 Decisions made to protect public trust resources do not
have to follow private trust law principles. In fact, the Alaskan
Supreme Court stated that doing so would be counterproductive:
For instance, private trusts generally require the trustee
to maximize economic yield from the trust property
using reasonable care and skill. But Article VIII [of
the Alaska Constitution] requires that natural resources
be managed for the benefit of all people, under the
assumption that both development and preservation
may be necessary to provide for future generations,
and that income generation is not the sole purpose of
the trust relationship.
214
The CNMI public land trust claims elements of traditional
public trust doctrine within its framework. It reserves all the public
land for benefit of its indigenous population and proscribes specific
uses for it.215 The Constitution also reserves the submerged lands off
the coast of the Commonwealth as part of the public lands owned
collectively by NMDs. 216 These submerged lands play a critical role
in the "navigable waters" concept implicit in the public trust.217 In
addition, constitutional provisions prohibiting the sale of the public
212 In the Matter of the Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97,
131, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (2000).
213 Van Dyke Interview, supra note 204.
214 Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Alaska 1999); see also Evans
v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (rejecting
the argument that public trustees governing public trust resources have duties
similar to those under a private trust, and concluding that courts have only a limited
role to review executive and legislative decisions regarding public trust resources).
215 See generally CNMI CONST. art. XI.
216 CNMI CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 3.
217 The Constitution provides that management of the submerged lands is
to be provided by law and not reserved for MPLCMPLA.
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land are in keeping with the public trust concept. Article XIV of the
Constitution reserves areas of importance to the culture, traditions,
and history of the people of the Islands for protection, preservation,
and public access. 2 18 Nonetheless, the correlation to the public trust
doctrine only extends so far, as the CNMI trust falls outside its
parameters in key respects. The trust property as a whole need not be
made available for use by the general public, nor must it be
maintained for particular types of uses.2 19 In fact, the Constitution
mandates private use of public land through its institution of
homestead and commercial leasing programs.
2. THE CNMI's "HYBRID" TRUST
The CNMI public land trust thus incorporates many aspects of
traditional trust law, including components of private and charitable
trusts, as well as the public trust doctrine. It was intended for an
identifiable class of beneficiaries as a private trust would be, yet it
was established to benefit what was, at the time of its creation at least,
the general public. It was devoted in perpetuity to a charitable
purpose, but it established a land management scheme which is
typically the domain of private trusts. Additionally, it claimed as part
of the trust property submerged lands that would normally fall under
the principles of the public trust doctrine. The CNMI public land trust
is truly a unique "hybrid" of traditional trust law principles.
As such, a clear elucidation of MPLA's fiduciary duties
becomes difficult. If the trust is private, then management of the
public lands should focus on maximizing the financial return on the
property. 220 On the other hand, if the trust is charitable then non-
economic considerations (specifically those that benefit the charitable
purpose of the trust) are pertinent to MPLA's role as a fiduciary.
Lastly, owing to the CNMI Constitution's adoption of public trust
principles in Articles XI and XIV, relevant concepts for resource
conservation, such as open space preservation and cultural protection,
apply as well. The Constitution and subsequent legislation, however,
218 CNMI CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
219 See generally CNMI CONST. art. XI.
220 Roth interview, supra note 196.
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have done little to define just what MPLA's fiduciary obligation
entails.
The dual management structure of the trust, however, provides
the key to this issue. One entity, MPLC, was tasked exclusively with
221property management.. MPLT, on the other hand, was to manage
the income generated from this management. 22 As co-trustees, the
entities possess distinct mandates which implicate different elements
of fiduciary care. This concept plays a critical role in the formulation
of a heightened standard for MPLA to be discussed infra.
C. THE CNMI SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
"FIDUCIARY DUTY"
In the absence of legislative guidance, we turn to the courts for
direction. Early era decisions by the Commonwealth Trial and
District courts paved the way for two CNMI Supreme Court decisions
- Govendo v. MPLC and Torres v. MPLC. These early cases provide
valuable insight into the development of the CNMI fiduciary duty
rule.
1. EARLY CNMI CASES INVOLVING MPLC
In Romisher v. MPLC, Chief Judge Robert Hefner of the
Commonwealth Trial Court held that the entire theory of a fiduciary
relationship is to accord the beneficiary the undivided loyalty of the
223trustee. Romisher sued MPLC as a beneficiary of the public land
trust, alleging that two MPLC board members had improperly
224participated in the board's approval of a land lease. The board
members had helped negotiate a land deal involving their own
property, a fact which they did not reveal to the rest of the board until
225just prior to the vote. With their votes supplying the needed
221 CNMI CONST. art. XI, § 3.
222 Id. at § 6.
223 Romisher v. MPLC, 1 N. Mar. I. Commonw. Rptr. 843 (1983).
224 Id. at 844.
225 Id.
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majority, the two board members were in position to receive
substantial remuneration for their property.
226
In response, Judge Hefner stated that "the members of the
board of directors of MPLC must perform their duties honestly,
faithfully, and refrain from activities which will interfere with the
proper discharge of their duties. ' '227 When acting in a fiduciary
capacity, one cannot circumvent these responsibilities by merely
disclosing a conflict of interest.22 8 Judge Hefner also interpreted the
CNMI public land trust structure in MPLT v. MPLC.2 2 9  In a
memorandum opinion, he characterized MPLC and MPLT as "co-
trustee[s]," with MPLC receiving funds for public lands and MPLT
acting as a depository for the funds.230 This is significant because the
Constitution does not explicitly refer to a dual management
composition of an overall "public land trust." Judge Hefner's opinion
provides an integral component to the appropriate interpretation of
MPLA's fiduciary duties in that it defines for the first time the dual
nature of the CNMI's public land trust while reinforcing the strict
standard of fiduciary duty that goes along with its administration.
2. GOVENDO V. MPLC
a. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In Govendo v. MPLC ("Govendo"), Roger Govendo, a minor
231
represented by his father and guardian ad litem Ken Govendo, filed
a complaint against MPLC, AIBIC International Corporation
226 Id.
227 Id. at 851-52.
228 Id. at 853. According to the court, allowing a fiduciary to circumvent
his fiduciary responsibilities merely by disclosing a potential conflict of interest
would create a gaping hole in the "armor of protection of a beneficiary." Id.
229 MPLTv. MPLC, 1 N. Mar. I. Commonw. Rptr. 968 (1984).
230 Id. at 969.
231 Presumably, the suit was filed in this fashion because the son was of
Northern Marianas descent, thereby making him a beneficiary of the public land
trust.
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232("AIBIC"), a developer, and the CNMI government. MPLC and
AIBIC had entered into a public land lease involving a 40,827-square-
233meter lot located in San Antonio, Saipan, adjacent to the lagoon.
The lease was for twenty-five years with an option to extend for
234
another fifteen years, subject to legislative approval.. AIBIC
intended to construct and operate a hotel with at least 250 rooms.235
Govendo's complaint alleged three causes of action: first, that the
MPLC board's execution of a lease agreement with AIBIC violated
its constitutional duty to act under a strict standard of fiduciary care;
second, that the leased area exceed five hectares, therefore requiring
legislative approval, which was not obtained, and that the lease was
void because it failed to prohibit the erection of any permanent
structure within 150 feet of the high water mark; third, that the hotel
project proposed by AIBIC would result in unsanitary conditions
caused by overburdened utilities, which would deprive him of his
constitutional right to a clean and healthful public environment.
236
The CNMI Supreme Court heard the plaintiffs appeal from the trial
court's granting of the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.237
The court upheld the lower court's dismissal of Govendo's
second cause of action claiming the lease between MPLC and AIBIC
238
was invalid.. On his cause of action alleging a violation of his
232 Govendo v. MPLC, 2 N. Mar. 1. 482, 487 (1992).
233 Id. at 486.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 487-88.
237 Id. at 490.
238 The court found that the terms of the lease called for an area less than
five hectares and that the failure of the lease agreement to specifically prohibit the
erection of a permanent structure within 150 feet of the high water mark did not, by
itself, constitute a violation of Article XI, Section 5(e) of the Constitution. See
Govendo, 2 N. Mar. I. at 498-500. The court examined both the language of the
original constitution and the 1985 amendment. Id. at 499. The original
constitutional language read as follows: "The Corporation may not transfer an
interest in public lands located within one hundred fifty feet of the high water mark
of a sandy beach." Id. at 500. The 1985 amendment reads: "The Corporation may
not transfer an interest, and may prohibit the erection of any permanent structure, in
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constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, the court
overruled the dismissal, holding that it was indeed a sustainable
239
claim. Each claim is discussed next.
b. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE FIDUCIARY
DUTY CLAIM
The CNMI Supreme Court held that Govendo's first cause of
action, which alleged a breach of MPLC's fiduciary duty, was
properly dismissed by the lower court. 24  Prior to analyzing
Govendo's claim, the court first interpreted MPLC's duty to act in
accordance with "strict standards of fiduciary care."
241
public lands located within one hundred fifty feet of high water mark of a sandy
beach, except that the corporation may authorize construction of facilities for public
purposes." Id. The Court held that, under the new language, MPLC was authorized
to prohibit the erection of permanent structure within 150 feet of the high water
mark and to authorize construction of facilities within this area only for public
purposes. Id. at 499. Since the lease agreement did not clearly state whether it
encompassed any land within 150 feet of the high water mark, the court held that
Govendo had not raised a valid claim. Id. The court did, however, hold that despite
the absence in the lease of a specific prohibition against any structures within 150
feet of the high water mark, AIBIC had no legal authority to build within this zone.
Id.
239 Id. at 501. In interpreting Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution
(stating that "[e]ach person has the right to a clean and healthful public environment
in all areas, including the land, air, and water. Harmful and unnecessary noise
pollution, and the storage of nuclear or radioactive material and the dumping or
storage of any type of nuclear waste within the surface or submerged lands and
waters of the Northern Mariana Islands, are prohibited except as provided by law")
to be self-executing, the court held that Govendo, and all persons affected in the
CNMI, had a constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment. See id. at
501. In addition, the court held that it had the power to enjoin a proposed
government or private activity which, if allowed, would "adversely and
unconstitutionally affect the cleanliness of the air, land, or water." See id. at 502.
The issue was not whether AIBIC's proposed hotel would actually cause such a
result, but rather whether Govendo's second allegation constituted well-pled facts
that stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 502. The court
ruled that Govendo should be allowed to prove his allegation that the building of the
hotel would lead to overburdened infrastructure facilities and unsanitary conditions,
which would destroy the reef and lagoon area. Id.
240 Id. at 492-97.
241 Id. at 490-91 (citing CNMI CONSI. art. XI, § 4(c)).
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As fiduciaries, members of the board of directors have
a duty of loyalty to the people of the Northern Mariana
Islands who are of Northern Marianas descent - the
direct beneficiaries. The people, as beneficiaries, have
entrusted upon the board the duty to act responsibly,
honestly, and in good faith. They are to act solely for
and in the best interest of the beneficiaries of the trust,
to the exclusion of the interest of all others, including
242their own personal interests.
The court, citing Black's Law Dictionary, defined "fiduciary duty" as
"a duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's
personal interest to that of the other person. It is the highest standard
of duty imposed by law."
243
With the key terminology defined, the court then analyzed all
six elements constituting the basis of Govendo's allegation. First, he
claimed that MPLC's lease of the largest piece of public land on the
western side of Saipan constituted a failure to act as a reasonably
244prudent trustee. The court found that nothing in MPLC's fiduciary
duty prevented it from leasing such a parcel.245 Because the lease
provided that all rental payments would go to MPLC as trustees for
the beneficiaries, the court held that MPLC was not acting contrary to
the best interests of the beneficiaries. 24 6 In addition, the court found
that Govendo's allegation failed to state how MPLC had failed to act
as a "reasonably prudent trustee. 247 Without more, the mere act of
leasing the parcel in question "does not constitute an imprudent
act.
, 248
242 Id. at 491 (quoting Romisher v. MPLC, supra note 223).
243 Id. at 491, note 5 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 625 ( 6 th ed.
1990)).
244 Id. at 492.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 492-93.
42 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL; Vol. 7, Issue 2 (Summer 2006)
Second, Govendo claimed that MPLC's lease of a large
portion of the remaining public land on the western side of Saipan,
knowing that there was little public land left on the lagoon,
constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty.249 Once again, the court
held that this alone did not rise to the level of a breach of MPLC's
fiduciary duty.25 ° "There has to be more alleged, such as, for
example, that it is against public policy, or that the land is needed for
a public purpose, which would be more beneficial to the
beneficiaries. 25 1
Third, Govendo alleged that MPLC ignored the fact that there
were no outdoor recreation facilities belonging to the people of the
CNMI who are of Northern Marianas descent and the leased land was
252the most logical piece of public land for such a purpose. MPLC's
failure to consider this, he contended, was a breach of its fiduciary
253 254duty.253 The court again found the allegation to be without merit.
It held that "MPLC has no affirmative duty to consider the existence,
or non-existence, of outdoor recreational facilities before leasing large
public lands.., which may be suitable for that purpose."
255
Fourth, Govendo alleged that MPLC's failure to consider, or
wrongful consideration of, the best interests of the public in
preserving public land for public use represented a breach of fiduciary
duty. The court ruled that whether public land should be preserved
257for public use was not a question of fact, but rather one of opinion.
"While some people may think so, others may feel that public land
may be used for private hotels, private golf courses, private farms,
249 Id. at 493.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 494.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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cattle pastures, and other non-public uses., 258 No Commonwealth
law required that public land be preserved for public use.2 59 On the
contrary, Article XI, Section 5(d) and (g) of the Constitution provided
that MPLC may transfer an interest in public land for commercial use
and receive compensation for it. 26°  MPLC's alleged failure to
consider this public interest, even if true, did not constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty according to the court. 61
Fifth, Govendo claimed that MPLC knew that the Director of
Land and Natural Resources was a major stakeholder of AIBIC and
that the Special Assistant to the Governor was acting as AIBIC's
262
agent.. He alleged that these facts constituted a violation of the
conflict of interest provisions of the Constitution263 and, therefore,
MPLC's knowledge and disregard for them amounted to a breach of
258 Id. at 494-95.
259 Id. at 495.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 CNMI CONST. art. III, § 6 (stating "[t]he Governor or lieutenant
Governor may not serve in another Commonwealth position or receive
compensation for performance of official duties or from any government body
except as provided by Section 5"). Amendment 40 to the CNMI Constitution
further states:
Section 1. Code of Ethics. The Legislature
shall enact a comprehensive Code of Ethics
which shall apply to appointed and elected
officers and employees of the Commonwealth
and its political subdivisions, including
members of boards, commissions, and other
instrumentalities. The Code of Ethics shall
include a definition of proper conduct for
members of the Legislature with conflicts of
interest and a definition of the proper scope of
debate in the Legislature, shall require
disclosure of financial or personal interests
sufficient to prevent conflicts of interest in the
performance of official duties, shall define the
offense or corrupt solicitation of public
officials, and shall provide for punishment of
offenses by fine and imprisonment.
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fiduciary duty.264 The court found that there was no allegation that
the Director or Special Assistant had any connection with or influence
over MPLC.265 Thus, the constitutional provisions cited by Govendo
were inapplicable. 266 The court held that mere knowledge of these
facts by MPLC was insufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty.2
67
Sixth, Govendo alleged that the decision making process for
the lease was done quickly and purposefully to prevent public
hearings or debate and, due to this lack of public input, MPLC
violated its fiduciary duty.2 6 8 The court held that Govendo's failure to
allege that MPLC actually had a fiduciary duty to hold a public
hearing was fatal to his claim.269 In addition, Govendo made no
allegation that a public hearing was requested, or that a public hearing
would have prevented specific acts or agreements contrary to the best
interests of the beneficiaries.
270
The court, in essence, ruled that MPLC had a duty of loyalty
to the beneficiaries of the trust but afforded broad deference to the
methods used to achieve that end. This seems to contravene the
notion of a constitutionally-mandated "strict standard of fiduciary
care," and a dissenting Justice proved to be more sympathetic to the
claim withstanding summary judgment.271
C. JUSTICE BORJA'S DISSENT
Justice Borja, while concurring in the court's judgment on
Govendo's second and third allegations, dissented from its analysis of
264 Govendo, 2 N. Mar. I. at 495.
265 Id. at 496.
266 Id. at 495.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 496-97.
269 Id. at 497.
270 Id.
271 CNMI CONST. art. XI, § 4.
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whether his claim for breach of fiduciary duty should withstand
summary judgment. 272 Besides the constitutional language, Justice
Borja cited Romisher v. MPLC as the only other case that had
addressed this issue. 273 Because of this, he classified it as a "novel"
area of the law and argued that the court should be reluctant to
dismiss such a case under Rule 12(b)(6). 274 "'The Court should be
especially reluctant to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings when the
asserted theory of liability is novel or extreme, since it is important
that new legal theories be explored and assayed in the light of actual
facts rather than a pleader's suppositions.' 275 Justice Borja found all
of the component claims in Govendo's first allegation to directly or
implicitly assert that MPLC had acted dishonestly, unfaithfully, and
276
not in the best interests of the beneficiary. In conjunction with the
novelty of the issue, Justice Borja found that Govendo's first cause of
action should not have been dismissed.277
Justice Borja's dissent is important because it recognized both
the significance of MPLC's fiduciary duty and the need for a fact-
based analysis of whether this duty was being met. Such an approach,
if adopted by the majority, would have provided a foundation for
answering the question that still troubles the CNMI today: what is
required of the public land management entity under a strict standard
of fiduciary care?
d. GOVENDO'S FIDUCIARY DUTY RULE
In affirming the lower court's dismissal of Govendo's
fiduciary duty claim, however, the Supreme Court said little about the
actual standard to which MPLC should be held. Because it was
272 Govendo, 2 N. Mar. I. at 504.
273 Id. at 505 (citing Romisher v. MPLC, supra note 223 at 845).
274 Id. at 505.
275 Id. at 505-06 (quoting 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1357 (1990)).
276 Id. at 508.
277 Id. at 506-07.
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addressing the issue from the perspective of a Rule 1 2(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the court focused its inquiry on the inadequacy of Govendo's
allegations and said little about the standard or how it should be
applied. This is evidenced by the continued references to what
Govendo should have alleged in order to have survived the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.278
A closer look at the court's language, however, offers some
insight into MPLC's fiduciary duty. First, the court implies on
numerous occasions that MPLC should be granted a high degree of
deference to its public land leasing decisions as long as the
corporation can show that the lease is financially beneficial to the
trust. For example, the court suggests that MPLC's fiduciary duty
does not prevent it from leasing the largest piece of public land on the
western side of Saipan since the lease calls for financial remuneration
279that will benefit the trust beneficiaries.. Second, the court appears
to say that MPLC's fiduciary duty does not include an affirmative
duty to consider whether, in deciding upon a lease of public land,
people of Northern Marianas descent are adequately represented in
areas of business for which the land is ideally suited. 280 Third, the
court implies that MPLC is not obligated to consider the diminishing
amount of public land available for public purposes. 281 Finally, the
court states that MPLC has no affirmative duty to ensure public
participation in its decision making process. 282
Even though the court did not set forth a bright-line test to
guide MPLC in the exercise of its fiduciary duties, one may be
inferred from its analysis of Govendo's first cause of action. A
characterization of the rule can be summed up as follows: "MPLC
has broad discretion under its fiduciary duty to enter into leases for
public lands. Regardless of size, location, and the overall amount of
available public land, the corporation may dispose of public lands as
it sees fit, so long as it can show reasonable financial remuneration for
the lease. MPLC has no duty to afford the public a voice in its
278 Id. at 492-97.
279 Id. at 492-93.
280 Id. at 494.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 497.
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administrative process." This deferential standard not only
contravenes the CNMI Constitution's clear intent to elevate public
land management to a fiduciary level but also flies in the face of
established concepts of fiduciary care. This questionable standard
was soon developed, and altered by the court, in Torres v. MPLC.
3. ToRREs v. MPLC AND NAKAMOTO ENTERPRISES,
LTD.
a. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1993, the year after Govendo, the CNMI Supreme Court
heard arguments in the case of Torres v. MPLC and Nakamoto
Enterprises, Ltd. ("Torres"). The plaintiff, a well-known legislator
from Saipan, opposed a lease agreement entered into between MPLC
and Nakamoto for 22,950-square-meters of beachfront public land on
Saipan for the construction of a 450-room hotel.283 Torres brought an
action that mirrored the claims of Govendo.284 He alleged: (1) that
MPLC breached its duty of fiduciary care in the formation of the
lease, (2) that the leased property exceeded five hectares, which
required legislative approval, and that the lease failed to prohibit
construction of permanent structures within 150 feet of the high water
mark, and (3) that the construction and operation of the hotel would
result in adverse environmental impact, violating his constitutional
right to a clean and healthful environment.285 The trial court initially
denied the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.286 The plaintiff then renewed his motion for summary
judgment, and the court heard the motion on February 26, 1992.287
Rather than ruling on plaintiff s summary judgment motion, the trial
court instead issued an order dismissing plaintiffs first and second
283 Torres v. MPLC and Nakamoto Ent., Ltd., 3 N. Mar. 1484, 486 (1993).
284 Id. at 489-90.
285 Id. at 486-87.
286 Id. at 487.
287 Id.
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causes of action for failure to state a claim. 288 The court did,
however, find a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
plaintiffs third cause of action and ordered the parties to brief the
issue of whether the court had jurisdiction.2 89 After a hearing, the
court dismissed it, holding that the Coastal Resources Management
agency ("CRM") was the proper agency to address the environmental
issue.2 90
b. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF TORRES'
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
On appeal, the court reviewed two issues: First, whether the
trial court erred in dismissing the first cause of action (breach of
fiduciary duty) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and, second, whether the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over the third cause of action (breach of
constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment). 29' On the
jurisdictional issue, the supreme court held that CRM's permitting
authority did not pre-empt it from considering "whether the lease, if
carried out, would have an unremediable impact on the
environment., 292 Regardless of whether the proposed hotel would
have the environmental impact that plaintiff claimed it would, Torres'
293cause of action was not premature for adjudication by the court.
Although patterned after Govendo's claim, Torres alleged that
MPLC failed to consider the best interests of the public in preserving
land for public use by "ignoring the intent and wishes of the public to
have the area preserved for a public park as expressed by their elected
representatives in resolutions adopted by the Sixth Legislature,
288 Id. at 487-88.
289 Id. at 488.
290 Id. CRM is the CNMI government agency that is responsible for
promoting the conservation and wise development of coastal resources. See CRM
Website, at www.crm.gov.mp.
291 Torres, 3 N. Mar. I at 489.
292 Id. at 492.
293 Id. at 492.
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Seventh Legislature, and the Saipan Legislative Delegation and
submitted to MPLC. 294 Torres also alleged that MPLC knew that the
appraised value of the land was inaccurate and, therefore, the lease
did not reflect the best interests of the people of the CNMI. 295 These
additional allegations convinced the court that Torres' cause of action
should have survived the motion for summary judgment.296
In regard to the plaintiffs first allegation, the court found that,
[t]his allegation is significant because MPLC, as a
trustee, has an affirmative duty to consider whether an
expression has merit or not. Here, it chose not to give
any consideration to such expression .... MPLC, as a
fiduciary, must consider legitimate public expressions
made with respect to public land disposition before it
297takes final action thereon. (emphasis added)
The court also held that Torres' allegation that MPLC could have
negotiated better terms of the lease may have merit. "MPLC,
although an autonomous agency of the government, may not do as it
pleases when leasing out public lands. It must comply with the
highest standards expected of fiduciaries. 298 For these reasons, the
court overturned the lower court's ruling dismissing plaintiffs first
299
cause of action and remanded the case for further consideration. It
is unclear what occurred when the case was remanded to the lower
court.
c. CRITICISM OF THE GOVENDO/TORRES RULE
The Torres decision seems to raise slightly the looser fiduciary
duty standard established by the Court in Govendo. The supreme
294 Id. at 490.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 491.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 492-93.
50 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL; Vol. 7, Issue 2 (Summer 2006)
court, perhaps due to the more specific factual pleadings in Torres
and changes in the composition of the court, imposed a slightly more
rigorous standard on MPLC. If the public expresses its will for the
public use of public land, then this expression must be considered as
part of MPLC's decision making process. 300 In addition, the court
stated that MPLC's financial arrangements are subject to less
deference and more scrutiny. 301 Indeed, MPLC is now held not only
to the "high" standard espoused in Govendo, but the "highest
standards expected of fiduciaries." 30 2 The court effectively raised the
bar for MPLC, which now must consider public expressions while
ensuring that its financial agreements reflect current market value for
the leased land. The court, however, did not define "public
expressions."
Still, the court said little about how this changed the
underlying test. The standards are now the "highest" but what exactly
does that mean on an operational level? What types of "expression"
must the current Board consider? Does the expression have to be in
the form of a legislative declaration? Or do a certain amount of letters
to the local newspapers, a website, and attendance at MPLA Board
meetings constitute a legitimate expression? Apparently, the
deferential standard of Govendo still applies, even though it appears
to flout the very notion of fiduciary care. While the court provided
slightly more illumination in Torres, it left numerous questions
regarding MPLA's fiduciary duty unanswered.
Bearing in mind the earlier analysis of traditional trust and
public trust doctrine, this paper argues that the CNMI court has
established far too low a standard for MPLC's obligation of fiduciary
care. This hybrid trust encompasses aspects of private, charitable and
the public trust and, as a result, unfettered deference to financial
performance is erroneous. This is the purview of private trusts, where
economic considerations trump all others. In a hybrid trust with a far
more complex mandate, this is an inappropriate standard. To manage
the public lands for the collective benefit of its beneficiaries,
MPLC/MPLA should be obligated to perform a far more in depth
inquiry. Failure to do so would negatively impact the Board's other
300 Id. at 491.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 492.
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mandates. 303 For example, focusing on leasing as much public land as
possible for commercial purposes would undoubtedly (and actually
has) negatively impact MPLA's ability to administer the homestead
program. Furthermore, article XIV of the Constitution requires the
preservation of places of cultural and social importance to the people
of the CNMI. 30 4 Ignoring this provision by shortsightedly pursuing
economic gain would lead both to a breach of fiduciary duty as well
as a breach of the Constitution.
D. COMPARABLE TRUSTS
Having determined that traditional and public trust principles
are only partially applicable to the CNMI's hybrid trust and with
limited guidance from the CNMI courts, it is useful to examine some
comparable trusts for guidance. Because every trust is unique,
however, it should be noted at the outset that analogies are
problematic. Each trust needs to be evaluated pursuant to its
governing document and in the relevant social and political context.
30 5
1. A SAMPLING OF POTENTIALLY ANALOGOUS
TRUSTS
A brief survey of potentially analogous trusts reveals no clear
match for the CNMI's public land trust. One such similar trust is the
responsibility maintained by the U.S. on behalf of numerous Indian
tribes as part of the federal government's trust administration of tribal
resources. 306 The federal government administers all funds required to
be deposited in the U.S. Treasury by treaty, statute, or contractual
provision.30 7 The funds are invested, in a manner designed to
303 See generally CNMI CONST. art. XI.
304 CNMI CONST. art XIV.
305 Van Dyke interview, supra note 204.
306 See generally FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
553-62 (Rennard Strickland et al., eds, 2d ed. 1982) (describing the relationship
between the federal government and the Indian tribes).
307 Van Dyke interview, supra note 204.
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maximize the rate of return, on an individual tribal basis in certificates
of deposit.3 08 The U.S. has been periodically sued for mismanagement
of these funds and for failure to maximize the return on investment.
30 9
Another potentially analogous trust is the relationship between
certain states and their public school systems. Upon admission to the
Union, some states received lands designed to be used to generate
revenue to support public schools. 310 The state acts as a trustee and is
"required to administer the trust estate under the rules of law
applicable to trustees acting in a fiduciary capacity." 311 In Nebraska,
trust lands are administered by the Board of Educational Lands and
Funds, which has five members, appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the legislature. 3 12  Meeting monthly, they have the
responsibility of managing 1.45 million acres of land, collecting rent
from leases and selling and trading land when appropriate. Nebraska
courts have stated that decisions by this Board "must be consonant
with the duties and functions of a trustee acting in a fiduciary
capacity.",3 13  This duty also limits what the state legislature can
require the Board to do. 314 The underlying element of the state's
fiduciary duty is the maximization of financial return from the trust
properties, subject to basic precautions for the preservation of the
trust.
31 5
Public utility or facility trusts are also somewhat akin to the
CNMI's public land trust. In Louisiana, the Louisiana Public
Facilities Authority ("PFA") was established by statute to help
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 State v. Cooley, 56 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Neb. 1952) (internal quotations
omitted).
312 Cooley, 56 N.W.2d at 133-34.
313 Pettijohn v. State Bd. of Educational Lands and Funds, 281 N.W.2d
901, 904 (Neb. 1979).
314 See, e.g., State ex rel Belker v. State Bd. of Educational Lands and
Funds, 171 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1969)(striking down an act requiring the Board to
sell its lands when leases expired).
315 Pettjohn, 281 N.W.2d at 904 (internal quotations omitted).
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finance public improvements and was funded by fees generated by the
issuance of bonds and investment earnings. 3 16 The Louisiana
Supreme Court described this trust as a "hybrid" of an active and a
charitable trust and characterized the PFA as a public entity, though
not a government unit.
3 17
While the three trusts discussed above all resemble, in some
capacity, the trust relationship between MPLA and NMDs, none offer
a completely viable comparison. Both the state/public school trusts
and the federal government/Indian trusts call for the maximization of
financial return as the critical element in the trustee's fiduciary duty.
The public utility trust of Louisiana, while similar in its "hybrid"
quality, says little about what fiduciary duties are involved in the
administration of such a trust.
Shifting the analysis to one of the CNMI's island brethren, the
State of Hawai'i, provides a far more analogous and helpful trust from
which to extract a fiduciary duty rule for the CNMI.
2. DEPARTMENT OF HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS AND
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
Perhaps the most apt comparison for CNMI's public land trust
can be found in Hawai'i's Department of Hawaiian Homelands
("DHHL") and Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"). Hawai'i and the
CNMI share similar histories of U.S. occupation, political affiliation,
and marginalization yet special recognition of the indigenous
population. The split management structure of the trusts is
comparable as well. Although a comprehensive analysis of the
history of Hawaiian land is too complex to undertake here, a brief
background and overview of these two entities follows as a
foundation for this paper's proposition that the CNMI public land
trust demands a heightened standard of fiduciary duty.
316 See e.g. Louisiana Public Facilities Authority v. Foster, 795 So.2d 288
(La. 2001).
317 See id. at 295-98.
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a. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
When Hawai'i achieved statehood in 1959, the United States
ceded to the new State almost all of the Hawaiian lands to which the
federal government held title. 318 At the same time, the U.S. imposed
obligations upon Hawaii with respect to this land.319 In particular, it
specified that such land, and the income from it:
shall be held by [Hawaii] as a public trust for the
support of the public schools and other public
educational institutions, for the betterment of the
conditions of native Hawaiians ... for the development
of farm and home ownership ..., and for the provision
of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and
income shall be managed and disposed of for one or
more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the
constitution and laws of [Hawaii] may provide, and
their use for any other object shall constitute a breach
of trust for which suit may be brought by the United
States.
320
The Hawai'i Constitution declared that a portion of the public lands
conveyed by section 5(b) of the Admissions Act would be held as a
"public trust for Native Hawaiians and the general public." 321 The
Hawai'i legislature subsequently established OHA to "serve Native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians. ' 322 OHA is funded in part by a share of
the income produced by the public land trust created out of the section
3235(b) lands. Among the lands conveyed by section 5(b) were lands
318 Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hawaii
Admission Act, Pub.L. No. 86-3 § 5(b), 73 Stat. 4, 5 (1959), as amended by the
Hawaiian Onibus Act, Pub.L. No. 86-624, 74 Stat. 411 (1960).
319 Price, 928 F.2d at 825.
320 Hawaii Admission Act, Pub.L. No. 86-3 § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959).
321 HAW. CONSI. Art. XII, § 4.
322 Price, 928 F.2d at 825-26 (citing HAW. CONSI. Art. XII § 6).
323 Id. at 826.
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known as Hawaiian "homelands." 324  The Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act ("HHCA"), originally a pre-statehood agreement
between the U.S. and Hawai'i, strictly limits the manner in which the
homelands may be managed.325 Thus, the public land trust created by
the Hawai'i Constitution does not include the homelands.
326
OHA is governed by nine elected trustees. 327 Although it is
frequently characterized as a government agency rather than as a trust,
its operations have been challenged regarding whether they meet
fiduciary standards. 328 In Price v. Akaka, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
consistently referred to the OHA Board as "trustees" and afforded
standing to Native Hawaiian plaintiffs deemed to be
"beneficiaries. ' 329  A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, however,
characterizes OHA as a state agency rather than as a trust.
330
OHA bears some resemblance to the CNMI public land trust.
It has similar, but more explicitly defined, goals intended to benefit
324 Id. at 826, n. 1.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 509 (2000).
328 Van Dyke interview, supra note 204.
329 Price, 928 F.2d at 824-30.
330 See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 at 499. In Rice, the Court held
that:
(1) limiting voters to those persons whose ancestry
qualified them as either a "Hawaiian" or "native
Hawaiian," as defined by statute, violated Fifteenth
Amendment by using ancestry as proxy for race, and
thereby enacting a race-based voting qualification; (2)
exclusion of non-Hawaiians from voting for OHA
trustees was not permissible under cases allowing
differential treatment of certain members of Indian
tribes; (3) voting qualification was not permissible under
cases holding that one-person, one-vote rule did not
pertain to certain special purpose districts; and (4) voting
qualification was not saved from unconstitutionality on
theory that voting restriction merely ensured an
alignment of interests between fiduciaries and
beneficiaries of a trust. Id.
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the indigenous population. Failure to manage the ceded lands for
these purposes may result in a breach of trust that, presumably, would
center on the board's fiduciary duty to satisfy the terms of the trust.
The Admissions Act even provides a private right of action to
beneficiaries for a breach of the trust that.
OHA, however, is best utilized as a foundation for
understanding a trust more comparable in form and purpose to the
CNMI's "hybrid" public land trust. The next section examines the
Department of Hawaiian Homelands and the trust created by the
Hawai'i Homes Commission Act.
b. DEPARTMENT OF HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS
In 1921, the U.S. Congress passed the HHCA, creating the
Hawaiian Homes Commission ("Commission") and designating
approximately 200,000 acres (the Hawaiian homelands) for the
"welfare and rehabilitation of Native Hawaiians. ' 331  The HHCA
empowered the Commission to lease parcels of lands to Native
Hawaiians at nominal rates. 332 Although the purpose of the HHCA
has been debated, most agree that its primary goal was to rehabilitate
the declining Native Hawaiian population by facilitating their access
to farm and homestead lands. 333 Upon its admission to the Union in
1959, responsibility for the administration of the Hawaiian homelands
was transferred to the State. 334 DHHL, headed by the nine-member
Commission, received exclusive control of the Hawaiian homelands
per section 204 of the HHCA.335
DHHL's mission is "[t]o manage the Hawaiian Home Lands
trust effectively and to develop and deliver land to native Hawaiians.
331 Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass 'n v. Hawaiian Homes
Commission, 588 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978).
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. (citing Section 4 of the Hawaii Admission Act, Pub.L. No. 86-3, §
4. 73 Stat. 5 (1959)).
335 See generally Ahuna v. Dept. of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327,
640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
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We will partner with others towards developing self-sufficient and
healthy communities. ' '336  The goal of the department's five year
strategic plan (2003-2008) is to provide every qualified Native
Hawaiian "beneficiary" on the waiting list an opportunity for home
ownership or land stewardship.
337
E. AHUNA v. DHHL - THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF A LAND
TRUSTEE
1. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the 1981 case Ahuna v. Dept. of Hawaiian Home Lands
("Ahuna"), DHHL appealed from a Third Circuit appellate ruling
which directed it, inter alia, to issue a lease to the plaintiff of a
specific ten acre lot.338 The appeal stemmed from a lower court
ruling, which held that DHHL had violated the HHCA by awarding
agricultural lots on a permissive use basis and that the department was
obligated to issue leases to available agricultural tracts to all Native
Hawaiian applicants qualified to perform the conditions of the
lease.
339
2. DHHL's FIDUCIARY DUTY AS INTERPRETED BY
THE HAWAIVI SUPREME COURT
The court in Ahuna ruled that the U.S. Congress created
DHHL as part of its obligation as trustee toward the Native Hawaiian
people and that the State of Hawai'i assumed this responsibility upon
statehood.340 The court provided a detailed analysis of the legislative
history of the HHCA, finding that, at the time of enactment, the
federal government stood in a trust relationship to the aboriginal
336 See DHHL website, at http://www.state.hi.us/dhhl/.
337 Id.
338 Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 327, 640 P.2d at 1161.
339 Id. at 329.
340 Id. at 338.
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people. 34 1 The State of Hawai'i assumed this commitment when it
entered into a compact with the U.S. to assume the management and
disposition of the Hawaiian homelands and to adopt the HHCA as a
provision of the State Constitution. 342  Additionally, the State
reaffirmed this compact by adding another provision to the
Constitution whereby it accepted "specific trust obligations" relating
to the management of the Hawaiian homelands imposed by the
federal government.
343
After establishing the existence of this fiduciary duty, the
court then set out to determine whether DHHL had breached this
duty.344  It began its analysis by looking to the federal
government/Indian relationship for guidance. In citing Seminole
Nation v. United States, the court found that, when the government
charges itself with the "moral obligations of the highest responsibility
and trust," its conduct should be judged by "the most exacting
fiduciary standards." 345  This language means that courts should
strictly scrutinize the actions of the government, holding it to the
same strict standards applicable to private trustees.
346
The court sets forth two specific trust duties for DHHL: (1) the
obligation to administer the trust solely in the best interests of the
beneficiary; and (2) to use reasonable skill and care to make the trust
property productive, or simply to act as an ordinary prudent person
341 Id. at 336.
342 Id. at 337 (citing the Hawai'i Admission Act of March 18, 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-3, § 4, 5 (1959).
343 Id. Article XII, § 2 of the Constitution reads:
"The State and its people do hereby accept, as a compact
with the United States, or as conditions or trust
provisions imposed by the United States, relating to the
management and disposition of the Hawaiian home
lands,... the State and its people do further agree and
declare that the spirit of the Hawaiian Homes
Conmmission Act looking to the continuance of the
Hawaiian home projects for the further rehabilitation of
the Hawaiian race shall be faithfully carried out." Id.
344 Id. at 338.
341 Id. at 339 (internal quotation omitted).
346 Id.
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would in dealing with his own property.347 Finding that DHHL had
neither properly considered the interests of the beneficiaries nor acted
as a reasonably prudent person would have, the court found that the
department had breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty.
348
3. FORGING A HEIGHTENED STANDARD - APPLYING
AHUNA TO THE CNMI TRUST
Although Ahuna is not, of course, authoritative in the CNMI,
due to the similarity of the trusts, the Ahuna standard for DHHL is
informative in a discussion of MPLA's fiduciary duty. The State of
Hawai'i and the CNMI each assumed a land trust obligation for its
indigenous people via constitutional provisions and assigned this duty
to a government entity to which strict standards of fiduciary care
apply.
In conjunction with the earlier discussion of the CNMI's
public land trust's hybrid, split-management set up, the Ahuna
standard represents the final piece of the fiduciary duty puzzle. When
applied to the CNMI trust, the standard establishes that MPLA must
manage the public lands as a reasonably prudent person would
manage his or her own, exclusively for the benefit of the NMD
beneficiaries. While the CNMI Supreme Court, in Govendo and
Torres, framed this as a subjective issue and therefore deserving of
judicial deference, an analysis of the language and foundational
principles of the trust reveals that the constitutional directive involves
much more than financial considerations. MPLA's fiduciary duty
encompasses facets of traditional private and charitable trusts, as well
as public trust principles, and this means that "benefit" must be
interpreted to include a broad range of factors beyond economics. To
illustrate this point, consider that, in addition to commercial leasing,
MPLA is obligated to manage a homestead program from the same
limited pool of public lands. If MPLA were to lease as much of the
public land as possible in order to maximize the economic value of
the trust, then there would be no more land for homesteads. In fact,
this scenario has already come to fruition with the suspension of the
homestead program on Saipan and Rota because of a dwindling
141 Id. at 340.
348 Id. at 342-43.
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supply of land. Clearly, the framers of the CNMI Constitution could
not have intended for commercial leasing to preclude the beneficiaries
of the trust from having access to homesteads.
The Pagan controversy brought issues like these to the surface.
One of the primary arguments advanced by PaganWatch and other
opponents of Azmar's proposal was that Pagan was of cultural and
historical significance and that the displaced residents still hoped to
return. In addition, the group, through its numerous editorials and
letters to the editor, raised concerns about MPLA board members'
alleged conflicts of interest, their secret dealings with Azmar officials,
and questionable financial decisions to illustrate that MPLA was not
operating anywhere close to a strict standard of fiduciary duty. The
uncomfortable reality is that the CNMI Supreme Court, when
presented with the opportunity to establish an appropriately high
standard of fiduciary duty, refused to do so. With the possibility of a
permit still under consideration, a heightened standard must be
adopted now in order to preclude an incomplete consideration of the
issues involved with a massive mining project.
This paper proposed that the CNMI Legislature should impose
upon MPLA a standard of fiduciary duty that explicitly adopts the
following elements: (1) the preservation of open space for public
access and/or future homestead use; (2) the implementation of a "no
tolerance" conflict of interest policy; (3) a commitment to improving
administrative processes, such as public notice and open public
meetings, thereby allowing the NMD beneficiaries an avenue for
direct participation; (4) a commitment to article XIV of the
Constitution, accounting for preservation of places of cultural and
historical significance; and (5) a commitment to article I, section 9 of
the Constitution entitling all CNMI residents to a clean and healthful
environment. With the court unlikely to address the issue any time
soon and MPLA seemingly unwilling to do so, the Legislature is left
with the responsibility of defining, once and for all, what the CNMI
Constitution meant when it imposed the seemingly clear but hard to
implement standard of fiduciary duty.
V. CONCLUSION
On February 22, 2006, subsequent to the original draft of this
paper, the CNMI legislature dissolved MPLA through the Public
Lands Act of 2006. This Act created, once again, a Division of Public
Lands within the Executive branch and transferred all of MPLA's
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responsibilities to this agency.349 Section 2 of the Act states that,
"[t]he Comonwealth's experience with the management of public
lands over the years has demonstrated the need for additional controls
to ensure that this valuable resource is administered in compliance
with the requirements and fiduciary duties imposed by the
Constitution." 350 The Act repealed Public Laws 10-57, 12-33, and 12-
71.351 While this change has an obvious impact on much of the
analysis contained herein, it does not render the need for a higher
standard of fiduciary duty irrelevant. If anything, the CNMI's
continued struggle to create an entity capable of successfully
managing its public lands in accordance with its constitutional
mandate shows that a heightened standard is as important, if not more
so, than ever.
The scope of fiduciary duty implicit in the management of the
CNMI's collectively-owned public lands is far broader than either the
responsible agencies or the CNMI Supreme Court has interpreted it to
be. Rather than the economically-based, deferential standard in place
now, the foregoing analysis has shown that the CNMI Constitution
requires a higher standard of fiduciary management from its public
land management entity. Applying elements of traditional trust law,
public trust doctrine, and incorporating concepts from a similar
Hawaiian trust, a standard emerges that is particularly appropriate to
this unique hybrid trust. To manage this trust in accordance with the
trust instrument, MPLA needs to adhere to a standard of fiduciary
duty that re-affirms its commitment to constitutional principles,
eliminates improper influence, incorporates administrative process,
and preserves open space. The sustainable future of the CNMI public
land trust depends on it.
349 See Public Lands Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 15-2, at
http://www.cnmilaw.org/public-lawsl5.php.
350 Id.
351 Id.
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I. ABSTRACT
The secrecy that surrounds capital punishment in Japan is
taken to extremes not seen in other nations. This article describes the
Japanese state's policy of secrecy and explains how it developed in
three historical stages: the "birth of secrecy" during the Meiji period
(1867 - 1912); the creation and spread of "censored democracy"
during the postwar Occupation (1945 - 1952); and the "acceleration
of secrecy" during the decades that followed. The article then
analyzes several justifications for secrecy that Japanese prosecutors
provide. None seems cogent. The final section explores four
* The field research for this article was conducted in Japan from August
2003 to May 2004. In addition to the sources listed in the footnotes, the article
relies on interviews conducted with Japanese criminal justice professionals and
capital punishment informants, including 16 prosecutors, 21 defense attorneys, 5
judges, 12 professors, 10 journalists, 5 politicians, 3 police officers, 6 members of
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were guaranteed anonymity. Death penalty research was also conducted in China
(two weeks), Taiwan (one week), and South Korea (two weeks).
* David T. Johnson is Associate Professor of Sociology and Adjunct
Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii. He is the author of The Japanese
Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2002).
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meanings of the secrecy policy that relate to the sources of death
penalty legitimacy, the salience of capital punishment, the nature of
Japan's democracy, and the role and rule of law in Japanese society.
IT]he purpose of secrecy is, above all, protection.
Georg Simmel1
II. "REIKO IN WONDERLAND"
On 19 September 2002, Reiko Oshima, a member of the
progressive but unpopular Social Democratic Party and a Member of
Parliament in Japan's Lower House, visited the warden of the Nagoya
Detention Center and tape-recorded the following conversation. 2 It
was the day after convicted murderer Yoshiteru Hamada had been
executed in the same Nagoya facility, and the warden, Tsukasa
Yoshida, was one of a handful of state officials who witnessed the
hanging. By Ministry of Justice policy, no "private persons" were
allowed to attend.
Oshima: What about Mr. Hamada?
Yoshida: Who's Mr. Hamada?
0: Yoshiteru Hamada, the man who was executed here
yesterday.
Y: Who said he was executed here yesterday? I have no
comment. Where did you hear that?
0: I have heard that members of his family came here, and it
has been reported by the mass media, right?
Y: No comment.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 345 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans.
1950).
2 SHIKEI HAISHI HENSHU IINKA, SHIKEI HAISHI HOAN 266 (2003).
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0: You mean you cannot say that it was Mr. Hamada?
Y: No comment.
0: Warden Yoshida, you are tight-lipped aren't you?
Y: I'm a corrections man, and I've lived my life as a prison
official.
0: If you are saying that you did not execute Mr. Hamada,
then why have you not protested against the newspaper
articles that say he was hanged?
Y: I don't know where that came from, but since it has not
been verified I have no comment. Now I have a question for
you Ms. Oshima. Do you think all news reports are true? Is
the news 100 percent accurate?
0: When did the death warrant from the Minister of Justice
arrive?
Y: Like I said, no comment. As I keep telling you, if the
premise is that there was an execution, I cannot answer your
questions.
0: OK then, as a general matter, how many detention center
officials participate in an execution?
Y: I don't have a hold on that information, and I don't feel the
need to reply.
0: I also heard from a defense lawyer that there was an
execution here yesterday.
Y: No comment.
0: Warden Yoshida, how many executions have you been
involved in?
Y: No comment...
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0: Warden, why don't you acknowledge yesterday's
execution?
Y: On what basis are you speaking?
U: You know, yesterday even Minister of Justice [Mayumi]
Moriyama responded [to my request for a meeting about
Hamada's execution].
Y: Did she say that there was an execution in Nagoya? I heard
that you met with the Minister...
0: Minister Moriyama admitted that she signed her second
death warrant.
Y: I'm not in a position to speak on this subject...
0: Did you inform Mr. Hamada's family about yesterday's
execution? What is the latest news?
Y: No comment...
0: Some people from the world outside cannot meet with
inmates on death row because of orders issued by the prison.
What do you have to say about this?
Y: My thinking is the same as Warden Kameoka [the previous
Nagoya warden]. Meetings with outsiders are forbidden in
order to promote the emotional stability of the inmates.
0: This spring I sent a letter [to another death row inmate in
the Nagoya jail], but since I have not yet received a reply I
don't know if it arrived. Did it reach him?
Y: I don't know. I have not looked into it.
0: Could you please look into it for me?
Y: No comment...
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0: I heard from the lead attorney in Gifu prefecture that Mr.
Hamada's family came to Nagoya [after the execution].
Y: I don't know.
0: You're trying to make me look like a fool, aren't you? The
previous warden, Mr. Kameoka, spoke more straightforwardly
about matters like this. I shouldn't make comparisons, but
Warden Kameoka wore a grim expression after an execution.
You're smiling.
Y: If you pressure me I'm going to get mad. What do you
want? For me to look uptight?
0: This winter, will there be stoves to heat the cells in this
detention center?
Y: This winter we will do the same as we always do [that is,
no heating]...
0: OK, I am submitting this letter of protest to you.
Y: I cannot accept it.
0: Then I'll place it here on the table.
Y: I'm just going to put it through the shredder.
0: Are you saying it will become garbage?
Y: If you pressure me I'll get mad.
0: [Addresses the letter to Warden Yoshida.]
Y: I cannot accept it even if it is addressed to me.
0: [Continues to write...] I'll sign my name too.
Y: I cannot accept it.
0: You know, this is the first time I've met a warden in this
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way. I'm not doing it because I'm a Member of Parliament,
I'm doing it because I just happened to get this position and
the responsibility that comes with it. On the Detention
Center's front lines, nothing at all is said about executions. It
seems like your plan is to concentrate all information about
executions in the Ministry of Justice. In a democratic society,
that's not right...
Y: I have no comment about executions.
0: Who told you that you cannot comment about executions?
Y: It's not a matter of who told me. It's because I'm working
in the field [at a Detention Center].
0: This conversation is not going anywhere. I'm leaving.
[Once again Oshima presents the letter of protest to Warden
Yoshida.]
Y: I cannot accept it.
0: Why can't you accept a letter that is addressed to you?
Y: I'm bothered by the way you're treating me.
0: I'm going to place the letter here on the table and leave.
Y: I cannot accept it.
0: Well then, please write "unaccepted" on it.
Y: I don't want to write "unaccepted" on it.
0: [Stands up from her seat and begins to leave...]
Y: [Follows after Oshima and attempts to return the letter to
her...]
0: If you touch me that'll be sexual harassment.
Y: What the... [Placing the letter on top of a cabinet in the
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hallway...] I'm putting it here.
In February 2004, I interviewed Reiko Oshima for 8 hours in
her Nagoya office. By this time she had lost her seat in Parliament
but had not lost her passion about capital punishment:
It's like Alice in Wonderland, isn't it? Or perhaps we
should call it "Reiko in Wonderland." A person has
just been killed, journalists have already published the
fact [in the previous evening's newspapers], and yet
the executioner refuses to acknowledge the reality.
Why? Because the state wants to discourage debate
about the death penalty and because, frankly, many of
the state officials who participate in executions don't
like doing it. Still, Warden Yoshida's denials are
strange, aren't they? His predecessor, Warden
Kameoka, was more forthcoming, and do you know
what happened to him? He was transferred from the
Detention Center in Nagoya [Japan's fourth largest
city] to [the Detention Center in the much smaller city
of] Tokushima [on the island of Shikoku]. That's not a
promotion. The Ministry of Justice [which is run by
prosecutors who control such transfers] does not want
prison officials to talk about the death penalty. Those
who do get punished. In this sense, silence is
professional common sense. Warden Yoshida was just
a cog in the state's killing machine, and the Ministry of
Justice is both the engine and the driver.. .Events that
day were even stranger than the tape-recording
suggests. In fact, while [my daughter] Moe [who, as
Oshima's secretary, accompanied her to the Nagoya
Detention Center] was taking notes during the
conversation with Warden Yoshida, other prison
officials were desperately peering over her shoulder
trying to see what she was writing. It was so absurd I
didn't know whether to laugh or cry.
Nine months before Warden Yoshida's "Who's Hamada?" response,
Reiko Oshima did cry when she observed the corpse of another man
(Toshihiko Hasegawa) who had been hanged in the same Nagoya
gallows. The condemned's sister had permitted Oshima to
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photograph her brother's dead body after the state transferred it to her.
The photos (which Oshima showed me) reveal large bruises where the
rope bit and a neck that was stretched to an unnatural length by the
force of the drop and by the 30 minutes that Hasegawa dangled. On 3
April 2002, Oshima showed the photographs to Minister of Justice
Mayumi Moriyama and to executive prosecutor Yuki Furuta during a
meeting of the Diet's Judicial Affairs Committee. "This is the reality
of hanging," Oshima declared as she displayed an image few Japanese
had ever seen. "Capital punishment is unconstitutionally cruel."
Oshima believes the Minister of Justice was "stunned" by what she
saw. On videotape, the woman who had signed Hasegawa's death
warrant can be seen staring in silence at the photo for several seconds
before replying that she "already knew the death penalty is an
extremely severe sanction" and that it therefore "must be administered
as carefully as possible." 3 In an interview some time later, Furuta,
who led the team of prosecutors that selected Hasegawa from a pool
of more than 50 death row inmates whose convictions had been
finalized by the Supreme Court, told me that Oshima's use of the
photographs was "shameful." "It was an affront to the Minister and to
me," Furuta fumed, "and it was an insult to the deceased. There is no
reason for doing something like that.",
4
3 The Hasegawa case is also notable because Masaharu Harada, the
brother of one of the victims, repeatedly urged the Minister of Justice not to
authorize execution since he "needed to talk" with the condemned and since he
believed that the repentant Hasegawa should continue atoning for his crimes. In the
months leading up to the hanging, Harada appeared on several television shows to
explain his views and to argue against execution. His face was hidden for fear of
retaliation from death penalty supporters. Interview with Masaharu Harada, in
Nagoya (2/8/04). Some commentators believe Japanese prosecutors are
increasingly adopting a "victim-service" mentality of the kind that is common in the
United States. Shinichi Ishizuka, Shushinkei Donyu to Keibatsu Seisaku no Henyo,
GENDAI SHISO, Mar. 2004, at 170; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 57 (2003). Although the trend seems to be in that
direction, the Hasegawa case suggests there is reason to wonder about the sincerity
of some "victim-service" claims. As Harada sees it, "The government cites
bereaved families' sentiments as a basis for maintaining the death penalty, but it
completely ignored my wish when it executed Mr. Hasegawa." Harada, supra.
4 Other prosecutors were similarly critical of Oshima's decision to tape-
record the conversation with the Nagoya Warden. One called it a "dirty tactic."
Interviews, Tokyo (Feb.-Mar. 2004).
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A. SECRECY AND SILENCE
But Reiko Oshima does have her reasons, chief of which is the
desire to expose the reality of capital punishment in a country where
the state kills in secret. 5 Capital punishment in the United States has
become increasingly hidden, privatized, and bureaucratized over the
last 150 years6, but the secrecy and silence that shroud Japan's death
penalty are taken to extremes not seen in other nations. Warden
Yoshida's evasions are but one brick in a much larger wall of denial
that surrounds the death penalty in Japan. This section summarizes
sixteen more.
1. Inmates on Japan's death row are not notified of the date or
time of execution until an hour or so before it occurs. Former prison
officials suggest that some condemned are extracted from their cells
on the ruse that they are "wanted in the office". 7 At most, the about-
to-be-killed are given only enough time to clean their cells, write a
final letter, and receive last rites. Death penalty supporters have
called this sudden "your-time-has-come" policy a "surprise attack"
(damashi-uchi). Whatever the nomenclature, what it means is that the
condemned live for years not knowing if the present day will be their
last. Sakae Menda, who was exonerated and released in 1983 after
spending 34 years on death row, had this to say about Japan's prior
notification policy: "Between 8:00 and 8:30 in the morning was the
most critical time, because that was generally when prisoners were
notified of their execution.. .You begin to feel the most terrible
anxiety, because you don't know if they are going to stop in front of
your cell. It is impossible to express how awful a feeling this was. I
5 Following Scheppele's seminal study, a "secret" is "a piece of
information that is intentionally withheld by one or more social actor(s) from one or
more other social actor(s)." KIM LANE SCHEPPLE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (3rd ed. 1988).
6 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2002); Annula Linders, The Execution Spectacle and State Legitimacy: The
Changing Nature of the American Execution Audience, 1833-1937, 34 L &Soc.
REv. 607 (2002).
7 TOSHIO SAKAMOTO, SHIKEI WA IKA NI SHIKKO SARERU KA 69 (2003).
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would have shivers down my spine. It was absolutely unbearable." 8
2. Relatives of the condemned are told of the execution after the
fact and are given twenty-four hours to collect the body. Most
cadavers go uncollected. Relatives of the victim are not told
anything.
3. Defense lawyers receive no prior notification. If they want to
postpone an appointment with the hangman, they must guess when to
file extraordinary appeals.
9
4. The Japanese public receives no advance notice of executions.
This minimizes protest and limits debate.
5. In some cases, the execution team is not given prior
notification, in large part out of fear that if they are told in advance
they may not show up for work. When members of the team are
given prior notice, they are told the day before, they are ordered not to
tell anyone else about the assignment, and they are urged to "be
grateful" for receiving such an "honorable assignment." Executioners
are not allowed to refuse the assignment.
10
6. After the condemned has been killed, the state sends news
agencies a notification by fax. A typical announcements reads as
follows: "Today in Tokyo, two death row convicts were executed."
That is all. The names of the deceased are not revealed (though
journalists may learn who they were through backstage
conversations), and the fax may not even indicate who is making the
announcement. Until 1999, the government did not make any post-
execution announcements at all,11 so journalists learned about
hangings when attorneys or family members told them a client or
loved one was gone. In some cases, death was discovered only after
8 Howard W. French, Secrecy of Japan Executions Is Criticized As Unduly
Cruel, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002.
9 Author's interviews with defense lawyers, September 2003 and February
2004.
10 SAKAMOTO, supra note 7, at 35.
11 Yuji HARA, KOROSARERU TAME NI IKIRU TO IU KOTO: SHIMBUN KISHA
TO SHIKE MONDA 13 (1997).
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mail addressed to the deceased was returned to the sender unopened. 12
7. No "private persons" are allowed to attend hangings: No
journalists, no relatives or friends of the victim, no family or friends
of the condemned, no scholars, and no members of the general public.
The only persons permitted to witness executions are a handful of
state officials: a prosecutor, a prosecutor's assistant, the warden of the
jail where the gallows is located, and members of the execution
team. 
13
8. A "spiritual advisor" can attend the hanging but (unlike the
situation in the United States) condemned persons in Japan are not
free to choose who it will be. Instead, advisors must be selected from
a list of state-approved clergy, none of whom is openly abolitionist.
Activity that the state deems "political" will result in removal from
the list. Proscribed behavior includes actions that could cultivate
"hope" in the condemned. 
14
9. Citizens and the media are not allowed to view the gallows
even when it is not in use. In July 2003, nine persistent Members of
Parliament did get a tour of the new Tokyo gallows (before it was
ever used), but they were the first outsiders to see where the state kills
in at least 30 years. With this as "precedent," I asked Japan's
Prosecutor General if I could see it too. My request was refused (after
six months of deliberation), ostensibly on the grounds that opening
the gallows to me could create a precedent that would enable
"undesirables" to see it as well.
12 Author's interviews with abolitionists and defense lawyers, September
2003.
13 "The Japanese image of horror, of dying poorly, is dying alone." See
Susan Orpett Long, Becoming a Cucumber: Culture, Nature, and the Good Death in
Japan and the United States, 29 J. JAPANESE STUD. 66.
14 Books like Dead Man Walking - a spiritual advisor's description of how
condemned men in Louisiana spent their final days on death row could not be
written in Japan. This may help explain why the book and its author, Sister Helen
Prejean, are popular in Japan's abolitionist circles. SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD
MAN WALKING. AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1993).
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10. Between imposition of a death sentence and physical
execution, inmates on death row are socially extinguished through the
state's severe restrictions on meetings and correspondence. If one is
not a close relative or a defense lawyer, contact with the condemned
is all but impossible, and even if one falls into one of the two
permitted categories, strict limitations are placed on the frequency,
duration, and content of contacts.1 5 The state's stated reason for this
policy is to promote "stable feelings" (shinjo no antei) in the inmates
and thereby to help them "prepare for death," but one function of
killing socially before killing physically is the facilitation of "smooth"
executions in which demoralized inmates do not resist.
11. Prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice select execution dates
strategically, to minimize the possibility of ex-post protest and debate.
Among other calculations, executions almost always occur when
Parliament is in recess, usually on a Thursday or Friday (near the end
of the "news week" and as people are becoming preoccupied with
weekend activities). Execution dates are also selected to achieve
"justification by association." In August 1997, for example, Norio
15 Conditions on death row are harsh, especially for the condemned who
have had their sentences approved by an appellate court. In addition to being
detained in almost total isolation, death row inmates are not permitted to stand up,
lie down, or move without permission; they must sit and sleep in approved
positions; they are not allowed to receive letters from anyone except family
members; they are given five to ten minutes to eat each meal; they can exercise
outside of their cells (by themselves) just two to three times per week for 30
minutes a session; they may not choose which newspaper to read; foreign books and
all calendars are prohibited; their cells are constantly lit; and so on. KOICHI
KIKUTA, SHIKEI: SONO KYOKO To FUJORI 298-300 (1999). In 2006, the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations released the results of a questionnaire administered
to all of the persons on Japan's seven death rows. Fifty-eight out of 79 condemned
inmates (shikei kakuteisha) responded. The results reinforce the impression that
death row conditions are harsh. As the JFBA's report puts it, "The condemned are
not allowed to participate in any group activities... and communication with the
outside world is extremely limited." NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI, ANKETO KAITO
KEKKA HOKOKU 1, 5 (2006), at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/committee/list/data/enquete-a.pdf. Although
conditions on American death rows are deeply "dehumanizing" too, conditions in
Japan seem worse. See Robert Johnson, Life Under Sentence of Death: Historical
and Contemporary Perspectives, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION 648 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2003); see also SEIJIRO
YAMANO, SHIKEISHU NO INORI (1999).
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Nagayama, an award-winning writer 16 and Japan's most well-known
death-row inmate, was hanged shortly after a Kobe juvenile was
arrested for murdering an elementary school boy and placing the
victim's severed head on the school's front gate. The Kobe killer was
14 years old. Nagayama, who had lived for 29 years on death row,
committed four homicides in 1968 when he was a 19-year-old minor.
It appears that prosecutors chose him for execution at this time in
order to mobilize support for legislation that would "get tougher" on
juvenile offenders.1 7 Following Nagayama's execution, The Juvenile
Law was revised to make it easier to transfer minors to adult court.
12. The Ministry of Justice provides no explanation or
justification for why it selects certain inmates for execution while
permitting others to continue living. As of January 2006, 79 persons
(including at least three women) had received "finalized" death
sentences. By law, any of them could be chosen to die at any time,
leading critics to contend that prosecutors are "playing god."
Although length of time on death row is apparently one fact the
Ministry considers when deciding who to hang next, the other factors
remain unclear.
13. Ministers of Justice are appointed by the Prime Minister so as
to minimize the possibility of public protest. By law, the Minister (a
Cabinet member and almost always an elected politician) must sign a
death warrant before an execution can occur (though in practice it is
Ministry prosecutors who make the most important decisions about
who goes next). In recent years, most Justice Ministers have had no
local electoral district. They came instead from the ranks of
representatives in the House of Councilors' national district and from
"proportional representation" winners in the House of
Representatives. It appears locally elected politicians are avoided in
part to prevent a "problem" that was common before 1993:
abolitionists demonstrating against the death penalty in the Minister's
home district.18
16 NORIo NAGAYAMA, MUCHI NO NAMIDA (1990).
17 MASAKO SATO, GYAKUTAI SARETAKODOMOTACHI NO GYAKUSHU:
OKASANNO SEI DESU KA 13-14 (2001).
18 Yoshihiro Yasuda, Kokka to Shikei: Oumu to Iu Tenkanten, GENDAI
SHISO, Mar. 2004, at 44, 44-55.
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14. Members of Parliament who oppose capital punishment rarely
tell their constituents. As of May 2003, 122 of the 762 Members of
Parliament had joined the "Diet Members League for the Abolition of
Capital Punishment" (a decline from the peak of nearly 200 some
years earlier). Of these, "only two or three" tell voters their views on
the death penalty; the rest fear being punished at the ballot box.
19
15. Scholars and reporters are routinely denied access to death
penalty documents - including trial records - that by law should be
made public.20  In Kitakyushu, for example, prosecutors refused a
researcher's request to read documents related to a case in which the
defendant's death sentence was finalized after he withdrew his right
to appeal. Prosecutors claimed that providing the professor with
copies of the documents would "hinder the administration of
prosecution functions." 21 Withholding records discourages research
and reporting about capital punishment.
16. The Japanese state tries to insulate capital punishment from
international scrutiny. All of the practices described above serve this
end, as do the state's unwillingness to cooperate with interested
foreign visitors and its refusal to sign international treaties and
protocols related to the death penalty.
22
Although there are more bricks in Japan's wall of silence, 23 the
19 Interviews with members of Parliament (Jan.- Feb. 2004); Yasuda,
supra note 18, at 47.
20 CODE OF CRIM. PROC., art. 53.
21 Shinichi Ishizuka, Shikei Kiroku no Etsuran to Shimin no Shiru Kenri,
in SHIKEI SONCHI To HAISHI NO DEAL 183-193 (Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai ed.,
1997).
22 See SHIKEI HAISHI HENSHU IINKAI, SEKAI NO NAKA NO NIHON NO
SHIKEI (2002).
23 For example, capital defenders are often denied access to relevant case
evidence, in part because their discovery rights are highly restricted, but also
because "external checks on prosecutor power are almost non-existent." Daniel H.
Foote, Nichibei Hikaku Keiji Shiho no Kogi o Furikaette, 1148 JURISTO 165, 173
(1999). This leaves defense lawyers in the passive position of hoping that
prosecutors will not withhold mitigating and exonerating evidence. Their hope is
sometimes disappointed. The worst miscarriages in Japanese criminal justice occur
when prosecutors withhold evidence from the defense. See CHALMERS JOHNSON,
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foregoing summary does suggest its contours. The rest of this article
proceeds from two premises: there is no government power greater
than the power of life and death and no government intrusion more
invasive than the death penalty, and there is no government power in
greater need of public oversight. In Japan that oversight is missing.
Moreover, if transparency and accountability are two hallmarks of a
healthy democracy, then the secrecy that surrounds capital
punishment seems decidedly undemocratic. Albert Camus believed
that "Instead of saying that the death penalty is first of all necessary
and then adding that it is better not to talk about it, it is essential to
say what it really is and then say whether, being what it is, it is to be
considered as necessary." 24 State officials in Japan - and prosecutors
in particular - practice a "better not to talk about it" strategy. The
next section explores the historical origins of this policy, and the
following two sections examine the justifications of secrecy that
prosecutors provide and the meanings implied when the state kills in
secret.
III. ORIGINS
The secrecy and silence that characterize capital punishment
in Japan developed unevenly over the last century and a half. This
section identifies three historical moments of special significance: the
"birth of secrecy" during the first 15 years of the Meiji era (1867 -
1912); the creation and spread of "censored democracy" during the
American Occupation (1945 - 1952); and the acceleration of silence
in the decades that followed.
A. MEIJI BIRTH
Capital punishment in Japan was not always surrounded by so
much secrecy. Indeed, throughout most of Japanese history, death
was the main criminal sanction and was administered openly. Until
CONSPIRACY AT MATSUKAWA (1972); NOBuO KINOSHITA, SAIBANKAN NO HANZAI:
"ENZAI" (2001); DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN (2002).
24 ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE,
REBELLION, AND DEATH 178 (1960).
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the fourth century, when Chinese concepts of punishment began to
influence Japan's legal system, law and morality were inseparable
normative spheres, and perpetrators of many kinds were commonly
executed in public.25  The practice of capital punishment was
interrupted when Japan became the world's first abolitionist nation in
810. For three-and-one-half centuries thereafter -- until 1156 -- the
death penalty was defunct, a development that appears to have been
rooted in two social facts: the peace that Japan enjoyed during the
Heian era, and the flourishing of Buddhism which was introduced
26from China in 538. 6 Though the death penalty was never formally
abolished during this period, death-eligible defendants were routinely
exiled or given lesser punishments such as flogging, so Japan was "de
facto" abolitionist.
27
Executions resumed in 1156 following a violent rebellion
known as the Hogen-no-Ran. During the next seven centuries of
samurai rule - from the beginning of the Kamakura period in the
twelfth century until the Tokugawa era ended in 1867 -- capital
punishment again became the sanction of choice. Almost all crimes,
from petty larceny to murder, were punishable by death, and
execution methods ranged from boiling, burning, and crucifixion to
several levels of beheading.28  As in colonial America, capital
punishment in pre-modem Japan was more than just one penal
technique among many, it was the "base point" from which other
punishments deviated. Japanese officials used a variety of practices
to "intensify" the punishment and thereby create "degrees of death.,
29
Executions again became highly public affairs, both in order to
maximize deterrence and in order to demonstrate and celebrate the
25 KAORU MURANO, NIHON NO SHIKEi 40 (1992).
26 Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 IND.
L.J. 7, 7 (1996).
27 PETRA SCHMIDT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN JAPAN 11 (2002). There is,
however, some evidence that Buddhist rulers in India may have abolished capital
punishment before Japan did so in the Heian period. Moreover, some analysts
suggest that in 724 AD, seventy years before the Heian era began, Japan's Emperor
Shomu, a devout Buddhist, forbade the use of capital punishment. Damien P.
Horigan, Of Compassion and Capital Punishment: A Buddhist Perspective on the
Death Penalty, 41 AM. J. OF JURIS. 271, 283-285 (1996).
28 See TAKEO ONO, EDO NO KEIBATSU FUZOKUSHI (1963).
29 BANNER, supra note 6, at 53.
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"sovereignty" of the ruling authorities. 30
In 1600, when Englishmen sailed into Japan searching for
gold and trade, the foreigners were alarmed and appalled by the
corpses they encountered along the Tokaido road connecting Tokyo to
Kyoto. They were the remains of crucified criminals. The diary of
one English captain refers to bodies which after execution had been
hewn "into pieces as small as a man's hand" by the swords of passers-
by. 31 By 1637, the shogun had expelled all foreigners from the
country except for a small group of Dutchman confined to an island
off the coast of Nagasaki. Over the next 230 years of Tokugawa
history, countless Christians were publicly tortured and killed by
agents of a government that feared their "destabilizing" influence.
From 1614 to 1640, for example, at least five thousand Christians
were publicly executed, many through methods such as ana-tsurushi,
or "hanging upside-down in pits" that contained excreta and other
filth.32
Executions declined in number during the 18th century, but
since criminals could only be sentenced after a confession, coercion
was institutionalized as a means of obtaining the requisite evidence
33
- much as had been done in medieval Europe. 34 While the public was
informed of laws and orders, they were told little about punishments
because of the Confucian belief that too much knowledge might
encourage the calculators. Punishments were still administered in
public, however, and this plus their elaborated cruelty "served the
purpose of general prevention."
35
When the Tokugawa period ended in 1867 and Imperial rule
was restored, Meiji reformers realized the need to modernize all
30 DANIEL BOTSMAN, PUNISHMENT AND POWER IN THE MAKING OF
MODERN JAPAN 25 (2004).
31 GILES MILTON, SAMURAI WILLIAM: THE ENGLISHMAN WHO OPENED
JAPAN 180 (2003).
32 William Johnston, Translator's Preface, in SHUSAKU ENDO, SILENCE 8
(1966).
33 SCHMIDT, supra note 27, at 18, citing BOTSMAN, supra note 30, at 35.
34 John Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3
(1978).
35 SCHMIDT, supra note 27, at 18.
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aspects of Japanese society, including penal practices. Corporal
punishments were eliminated, status-based distinctions were removed,
mandatory death sentences were all but eradicated, barbarisms were
banned, and hanging became the only way the state could administer
death. By 1882, executions had to be carried out inside prison
grounds, and prison guards and other state officials were the only
persons permitted to be present. For the first time in Japanese history,
the principle of secrecy had been laid down in law. In 1908, Japan
enacted a Penal Code that is, for the most part, still in force today.
Hanging remains the sole means of execution (Article 11), and the
state's "officials only" attendance policy has not been altered. During
the long Pacific War (1931 - 1945), capital punishment "flourished., 36
Murders declined (as they usually do when young males are sent
abroad), so the number of executions remained relatively flat, but the
number of capital offenses increased, and the wartime spirit of
"giving all for the Emperor" muffled calls for abolition and reform
that had been common in the preceding years.
37
In comparative perspective, the transformation of capital
punishment occurred much faster in Japan than it did in Western
countries that experienced similar shifts from high to low usage,
public to private executions, and "barbaric" to "civilized" methods of
state-killing. A process that took a few years in Japan lasted centuries
elsewhere.38  Since the death penalty in some societies has deep
cultural roots,39 the concentrated nature of the Japanese changes
might seem to create the possibility for reversion to public "spectacles
of suffering" that had prevailed for centuries. That is not what
happened. Rather, the Japanese state held fast to the Western
standards it adopted and adapted, in large part because that is what it
felt it needed to do in order to earn the recognition and respect of "the
36 Id. at 29
37 Yasuda, supra note 18, at 45.
38 See BANNER, supra note 6; RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF
RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TN GERMANY, 1600-1987 (1996); PIETER
SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING: EXECUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION
OF REPRESSION (1984); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON (1977).
39 ZIMRING, supra note 3. But see also David Garland, Capital Punishment
and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC. 347.
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civilized world" that was then colonizing Asia.40 Here as on many
other occasions in its modem history, Japan was "invented" through
its encounters with the West.
41
B. THE OCCUPATION'S "CENSORED DEMOCRACY"
During the seven-year Occupation of Japan that followed its
defeat in 1945, death sentences and executions spiked. This was not
so much because of a punitive turn in criminal justice policy as it was
42the result of a steep increase in the number of homicides. In the
aftermath of "total war," millions of males returned to Japan, and the
"exhaustion and despair" that overwhelmed many people helped
spread a variety of social problems, from alcoholism and drug
addiction to corruption and crime of various kinds.
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (SCAP) who governed Japan for the first six years of
this period, regarded his host country differently than did his
Occupation counterparts in defeated Germany. For him and for the
other American men who ruled, "demilitarizing and democratizing" a
pagan, "Oriental" society was unequivocally "a Christian mission.,
43
MacArthur and many of the "old Japan hands" who had spent their
professional lives studying the country belittled the capacity of
ordinary Japanese to govern themselves. So did Yoshida Shiger,
Japan's most powerful post-Occupation politician. When MacArthur
left Japan for good in April 1951, at least 200,000 people lined the
streets of Tokyo to bid him adieu, some with tears in their eyes. Upon
his arrival in the United States, the General told a Senate committee
that "measured by the standards of modern civilization, [the Japanese]
would be like a boy of 12 compared with our [American]
development of 45 years. 44  Though this phrase struck many
40 See BOTSMAN, supra note 30.
41 See IAN BURUMA, INVENTING JAPAN, 1853-1964 (2003).
42 MANABU MIYAZAKI & AKIHIRO OTANI, SATSUJINRITSU: NIHONJIN WA
SATSUJIN GA DEKINA! SEKAI SAITEI SATSUJINRITSU NO NAZO 21 (2004).
43 JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD
WAR I123 (1999).
44 Id. at 549.
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Japanese like a slap in the face, the truth is that they, too, routinely
spoke of themselves as "MacArthur's children." 45 Indeed, the entire
Occupation was premised on Japan's acquiescence to America's
overwhelming authority. That authority forged many enduring
features of Japan's postwar polity, three of which are especially
relevant here: the decision to retain the death penalty; the capital
punishment precedents of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial; and the
legacies of the "censored democracy" that prevailed during the
Occupation period.
First, Occupation authorities could have abolished the death
penalty in Japan, and their decision not to was neither natural nor
inevitable. Indeed, the Occupation's "democratizing" agenda was
highly ambitious: land redistribution, equality of the sexes, the
downsizing of the emperor from "god" to a mere "symbol of the State
and of the unity of the people," the establishment of the Diet as the
highest organ of state power, the power of judicial review, the
renunciation of war, the creation of due process rights, and so on. But
the abolition of capital punishment was nowhere on the agenda. This
not only distinguishes the Occupation of Japan from the parallel
Occupation of Germany,46 it also helps explain why Japan today is
one of only two developed democracies that still practice capital
punishment.
Second, abolition never occurred in large part because
American officials were determined to put "war criminals" to death in
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. The "main trial" was actually one of
many. Altogether, some 5700 Japanese were tried on "war crimes"
charges, of whom 920 were executed.47 In the main tribunal initiated
by SCAP in Tokyo, 28 defendants were tried and 25 convicted (of the
remaining three, two died during trial and one was deemed
psychologically unfit to be adjudicated). No one was acquitted. (In
Nuremburg, three of the 22 defendants were found not guilty). Seven
of the 25 convicts were executed on 23 December 1948, just seven
45 Id. at 551.
46 EVANS, supra note 38, at 741.
47 By country, the number of war-crime death sentences was as follows:
Dutch 236, British 223, Australian 153, Chinese 149, American 140, French 26, and
Filipino 17. In addition, "the Soviets may have executed as many as three thousand
Japanese as war criminals, following summary proceedings." DOWER, supra note
43, at 447, 449.
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weeks after the Tokyo court's 11-judge bench had sentenced them to
death and just three days after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
defendants' appeal on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction in the
case. Before he was hanged, Hideki Tojo, who was both Prime
Minister and War Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor, said that "this
trial was a political trial. It was only victors' justice."48  Much
subsequent scholarship argues that this is an accurate assessment.49
The Tokyo Trial was flawed in numerous ways. None of the
judges was from a neutral nation, and only one came from a country
(India) that had not suffered directly and severely from Japanese acts
in the war. At least five judges had prior involvement in the issues to
come before the tribunal, including an American judge who was an
Army Major General and a Filipino justice who had survived the
Bataan Death March. Notably, no Koreans or Japanese served as
judge or prosecutor, and the death sentence votes in all of the capital
cases were either 6 to 5 or 7 to 4 (four defendants escaped death by a
single vote). At Nuremburg, by contrast, verdicts and sentences
required the approval of three of the four sitting justices. Had the
voting rule been similar in Tokyo, there would have been no capital
convictions. A 6-5 vote also determined the method of death, which
was hanging. Richard Minear, who has written the classic account of
the trial, believes the other option under consideration (firing squad)
may have been deemed "too dignified" for Japanese defendants.
50
All of the defendants at the Tokyo Trial were Japanese.
Considering the fire bombings of Tokyo and the atomic bombs at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there is room to wonder whether war crimes
in the Pacific were the exclusive preserve of America's enemy. The
48 Tojo was the only defendant to implicate the Emperor, which he did by
testifying that "it was inconceivable for him or any subject to have taken action
contrary to the emperor's wishes." In response to this defense, Prosecutor Keenan
and Occupation officials pressured other Japanese defendants to urge Tojo to rectify
his reply. One week later he retracted the statement. Id. at 468.
49 See RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIAL (1971); ARNOLD BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBURG: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIME TRIALS (1988); DOWER, supra note 43; HERBERT P.
Bix, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2000); TIMOTHY P. MAGA,
JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS (2001); Kentaro Awaya,
The Tokyo Tribunal, War Responsibility and the Japanese People, JAPAN FOCUS
(Timothy Amos tr.), JapanFocus.org (February 6, 2006).
50 MINEAR, Id. at 91.
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selection of Japanese to put on trial was arbitrary in the extreme.
Most conspicuously, Emperor Hirohito was nowhere to be found in
the indictments - and not because he lacked culpability. History
shows that Hirohito was hardly the reluctant, passive, wartime
monarch that SCAP, Japan, and the emperor himself presented for
public consumption. He was, rather, "a man of strong will and real
authority"51 who "bore enormous responsibility for the consequences
of his actions in each of his many roles. Yet, he never assumed
responsibility for what happened to the Japanese and Asian peoples
,,52
whose lives were destroyed or harmed by his rule. If anyone
deserved to be on trial on Tokyo, this was the man.53  SCAP,
however, made a calculated decision to preserve the person and
institution of the emperor in the belief that their continuation would
facilitate governing Japan and out of fear that trying and executing
Hirohito could create lasting resentment among the Japanese.
MacArthur's chief of psychological warfare operations even
suggested that trying the emperor would be "blasphemous." In some
respects, the Occupation decision to separate Hirohito and the military
leadership proved remarkably effective. Postwar Japan is much
richer, freer, and more egalitarian than imperial Japan ever was. On
the other hand, since the emperor's role in the war was never
seriously investigated, justice was rendered so arbitrary that the
Tokyo Trial has been called "an exercise in revenge," ''the worst
hypocrisy in recorded history," and "a white man's tribunal.,
54
As for the legal process itself, Chief Prosecutor Joseph
Keenan predicted on the eve of the trial that "in this very courtroom
will be made manifest to the Japanese people themselves the elements
of a fair trial which, we dare say, perhaps they may not have enjoyed
in the fullness - in all of their past history." 55 What ensued was
anything but. For one thing, the tribunal was not bound by "technical
rules of evidence," and this proved to be a gateway through which
much unfairness entered the proceedings. Among other problems,
51 Bix, supra note 49, inside cover.
52 The Emperor, Modern Japan and the U.S.-Japan Relationship: an
Interview with Herbert Bix, at http://japanfocus.org/article.asp?id-376.
53 DOWER, supra note 43, at 277.
14 Id. at 469.
55 M1NEAR, supra note 49, at 74.
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press releases from the prosecution were accepted as evidence, and
there was even "a conversation with a person since deceased" that the
court took into account. 56 Conversely, reams of relevant evidence
was excluded, including materials describing the conditions in China
prior to the time Japanese forces invaded, evidence about America's
A-Bomb decisions, and other information the defense wanted the
court to consider. American control of prosecution policy also
bordered on the absolute, with the main aim of insulating the emperor
from accountability. 57 Judges were frequently absent from trial (one
missed 22 consecutive days), and the whole panel of judges never
even met together to discuss their final judgment. 58 In the context of
criminal justice, "truth" has been defined as "accurate accounts by
competent people of what they genuinely believe they recall from
sensory experience" and the "honest production of papers and objects
relevant to legal controversies." 59 By this definition, the Tokyo Trial
produced little truth.
In the end, MacArthur could have commuted any or all of the
convictions. He chose not to. After a cursory review of the tribunal's
proceedings, he directed an American general to "execute the
sentences as pronounced," and he went on to implore "Divine
Providence" to "use this tragic expiation as a symbol to summon all
persons of good will to the realization of the utter futility of war."
60
When the seven condemned men were hanged two days before
Christmas in 1948, they were required to wear United States army
salvage work clothing rather than their old uniforms or civilian
clothes of their own choosing. 61 Of the eighteen defendants sentenced
to prison, six died there; the rest were paroled or released after their
sentences were reduced (the last in 1958). Many of them were
62
"woefully wronged" by a "highly defective" trial. Since they were
56 Id. at 120.
57 DOWER, supra note 43, at 458.
58 Id. at 465.
59 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE: Too MUCH FIGHT? Too
LITTLE TRUTH? EQUAL JUSTICE? 73 (1978).
60 MINEAR, supra note 49, at 167.
61 Id. at 172.
62 Id. at 177.
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the leaders of Japan and indicted as its representatives, the nation, too,
was dishonored.
Although much has been written about the Tokyo Trials, the
tomes do not answer many basic questions. How were established
principles of law reversed after Japan surrendered? On what basis
were the 28 unlucky defendants selected from a vastly larger pool of
possibilities? Why was the emperor invisible throughout the legal
proceedings? Why was the tribunal's voting rule tilted in favor of
conviction? Why were the normal rules of evidence undermined and
ignored? Why were the opinions of dissenting judges buried in huge
files? Why did the Occupation authorities block publication of Indian
Justice Radhabinod Pal's stinging dissent? And most importantly,
why has the record of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial never been
published in toto? 63 While the Nuremburg proceedings have been
made available in a 42-volume set, no official publication ever
emerged from Tokyo. As John Dower's magnificent study of the
Occupation concludes, "for all practical purposes, the record of the
[Tokyo] proceedings was buried., 64 Not even the majority judgment
has been made readily accessible. 65
Third and finally, though the secrecy that shrouds the Tokyo
Trial has an obvious affinity with the secrecy that surrounds capital
punishment in contemporary Japan, the legacies of the Occupation's
policy of "censored democracy" are broader than that. Much that lies
at the heart of contemporary Japan "derives from the complexity of
the interplay between the victors and the vanquished" during the
66Occupation. For this study of the death penalty, the most salient
feature of that interplay was a censorship bureaucracy, 6000 persons
strong, that extended into most aspects of public expression.
Censorship applied to all forms of media, from newspapers,
magazines, and books to radio, film, and theatre, and the policy itself
was often opaque because the lines between permissible and
63 Id. at 33.
64 DOWER, supra note 43, at 454.
65 Two English-language sources for the Tokyo Trial are JOHN R.
PRITCHARD, THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST, WITH AN AUTHORITATIVE
COMMENTARY AND COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (1998) and JEANIE M. WELCH, THE
TOKYO TRIAL: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SOURCES (2001).
66 DOWER, supra note 43, at 28.
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impermissible discourse were never made public. The secrecy of the
standards fostered a "pathology of self-censorship," a problem that
persists in Japan to this day.67 At one point during the Occupation,
more than 60 topics were considered taboo, including criticism of
SCAP or of any of its policies, mention of SCAP's role in writing the
new Constitution, and public justification or defense of any of the
defendants in the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Since the taboos included
public acknowledgement of the existence of censorship, SCAP
remained "beyond accountability" for the duration of the
Occupation. 68 Only after the American authorities left in 1952 did it
become possible to discuss forbidden subjects (such as abolition of
69
capital punishment) and the Occupation more generally. By then,
seven years of censored democracy had helped forge a postwar
political consciousness that to this day remains inclined to "acquiesce
to overweening power," "conform to a dictated consensus," and
accept authority "fatalistically. ' '70  Though these habits of the heart
67 See LAURIE A. FREEMAN, CLOSING THE SHOP: INFORMATION CARTELS
AND JAPAN'S MASS MEDIA (2000).
68 DOWER, supra note 43, at 412. In Okinawa, censorship lasted until
1955. While the United States built this prefecture into a major Cold War military
base, no news reports or commentaries were published in the Japanese press. Id. at
434.
69 In 1956 there were two days of discussion in the Diet about a bill to
abolish capital punishment, but it died in the next Diet session. SHIKEI HAISHI
HENSHU IINKAI, supra note 2, at 1. No subsequent Parliament seriously considered
abolition until progressives tried to introduce a "life-without-parole and
moratorium" bill in 2003. It failed in the face of conservative opposition led by
prosecutor-tumned-Parliamentarian Tomoko Sasaki. Interviews with members of
Parliament, supra note 19.
70 DOWER, supra note 43, at 439. Tomoko Matsushima, who interviewed
homeless people in the USA and Japan, notes that the homeless in Manhattan
frequently channel their anger into "criticism of the policies of city authorities, the
economic situation and other targets" such as the mayor or the market. Tomoko
Matsushima, Society Should Be Kinder to the Homeless, ASAHI SHIMBUN, August
20, 2004. In contrast, "not one homeless person [in Tokyo] ever complained to
[her] about politics, the recession, society or other contemporary issues."
Matsushima says she cannot explain the silence of her Tokyo informants, but
research suggests it may be one piece of a larger pattern of passive political
consciousness. DOWER, supra note 43; see also ATSUO ITo, SEIJI NO SUR (2005);
SHELDON GARON, MOLDING JAPANESE MINDS: THE STATE IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1997); DAIKICHI IROKAWA, THE AGE OF HIROHITO: IN SEARCH OF MODERN JAPAN
(Mikiso Hane & John K. Urda trans., 1995). In recent years, signs of a more
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have come to be considered "peculiarly Japanese," they are in large
part legacies of the American Occupation.71 What SCAP bequeathed
- retention of capital punishment, the Tokyo Trial precedents, and a
political consciousness that seems uncommonly comfortable with the
silences dictated by "censored democracy" - helps explain why
Japan's subsequent death penalty policy encountered little
resistance.
72
C. POSTWAR ACCELERATION
For more than a decade after the Occupation ended in 1952,
death row inmates in Japan were notified a day or two in advance of
their execution date and given the opportunity to arrange final
meetings with family and friends, to worship in a group with other
inmates, to receive spiritual counseling, to request last meals, and to
otherwise put their final affairs in order. 3 Until 1975, the condemned
were allowed to play softball together and to talk with inmates in
adjacent cells.74  These freedoms no longer exist. Viewings of the
gallows have also been banned and visits to death row curtailed.
Hideo Itazu, a prison guard in Nagoya from 1948 to 1963, says that
when he was a prison official, the Ministry of Justice held debates
about capital punishment and published abolitionist articles in its own
vigorous "civil society" can be seen in some segments of Japanese society. THE
STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN (Frank J. Schwartz & Susan J. Pharr eds., 2003).
71 DOWER, supra note 43, at 440.
72 Many Japanese journalists also illustrate these tendencies toward
fatalism and acquiescence to power. I interviewed ten reporters, all of whom
covered criminal justice. Few expressed interest in attending executions or in
expanding the circle of persons who can attend, and most knew little about the
state's secrecy policy. Though there are institutional and structural causes of these
dispositions (such as "press clubs" that discourage competition and encourage
reliance on official sources of information), elite Japanese journalists also possess
different sensibilities about their "proper role" compared with j ournalists in other
rich democracies. See FREEMAN, supra note 67; HARA, supra note 11; MARK D.
WEST, SCANDAL NATIONS: JAPAN AND AMERICA (forthcoming).
73 MURANO, supra note 25, at 15.
74 Ryan Connell, Life on Death Row Hangs by a Thread, MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 28, 2002.
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house journal.75  Forty years after Itazu retired, prosecutors
acknowledge that such practices are today "utterly unimaginable. 76
More generally, Japan's government, and prosecutors in particular,
have become increasingly unwilling to describe, explain, justify, or
discuss a wide range of death penalty policies and practices. At one
level, this postwar acceleration of secrecy is a puzzle because it
contradicts a trend towards more openness and accountability in some
other spheres of Japanese governance. At a deeper level, however,
insulating a practice with secrecy and silence is a common reaction to
threat. As the sociologist Georg Simmel put it, "The flight into
secrecy is a ready device for social endeavors and forces that are
about to be replaced by new ones. ' '78 Japan's postwar acceleration of
secrecy reflects the kind of anxiety Simmel had in mind, and this
section summarizes some of the forces that have quickened the Justice
Ministry's "flight."
In the first place, the death penalty in Japan is used much more
sparingly than it used to be, with executions falling from an average
of 800 per year during the first five years of the Meiji era (1868 -
1872) to an average of 18 per year during the first five years of the
Showa period (1926 - 1930) - a 98 percent drop in just 58 years. As
explained earlier, executions remained flat during the Pacific War
(1931 - 1945) and Occupation (1945 - 1952), but they declined
thereafter, from an annual average of 24.6 in the 1950s, to 13.2 in the
1960s, 9.4 in the 1970s, and just 1.5 in the 1980s. Death sentences
fell as well, from an annual average of 24.2 in the 1950s, to 15.1 in
the 1960s, 5.0 in the 1970s, and 4.1 in the 1980s. 79 Then, for the 40
months from November 1989 to March 1993, the Japanese state
executed no one because four successive Ministers of Justice refused
to sign (or had no opportunity to sign) the requisite death warrants. 80
75 Hideo Itazu, Jo ga Utsutte ne, Honto ni Tsurai Desu yo, 14 FORUM 90
1-2, June 1991.
76 Interviews with prosecutors in Japan (Mar. 2004).
77 Jonathan Marshall, Here Comes the Judge: Freedom of Information and
Litigatingfor GovernmentalAccountability, 23 Soc. SC. JAPAN 8, Apr. 2002.
78 THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL, supra note 1, at 347.
79 MURANO, supra note 25, at 53.
80 HARA, supra note 11.
